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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL:
Energy & Public Utilities.

Welcome to the hearing of the Senate Committee on

Let me introduce Senator Newt Russell to you, staff, Ann

Gressani and Patti Stearns on my right.
Today we are examining proposed new energy projects which promise greater competition
with our regulated utilities.

This morning we will be talking about the market for natural

gas, and the various proposals to serve substantial new volumes of gas to Kern County, the
site of our heavy oil fields.
Internationally, the eyes of gas producers are on our own Kern County.

The oil

companies are sitting on massive reserves of heavy oil and in order to produce that oil
within air quality goals, the oil companies will be buying a tremendous amount of new gas.
The prospect of this new market delights gas producers all across the United States and
Canaua because they're sitting on a glut of natural gas and desperately seek new markets.
It sounds like a perfect match, doesn't it?
idea
gas

to break up Ma Bell?

Remember when it sounded like a great

I'm afraid the analogy is painfully accurate.

Competition in

like competition in telecommunications, is leading to producers falling over each

other with

breaks for big industrial customers--customers big enough that they will

not even need the traditional utility system to serve them.
the built-in

And left holding the bag for

fixed costs of the utility system are our residential ratepayers, the custo-

mers too small to leave the regulated utilities.
Today we will be looking into this threatened new form of potential "bypass" and try
to find methods of protecting our ratepayer/constituents before the horses are out of the
barn.

We still have time to examine the needs in Kern County and set up conditions for

new gas

that will not harm existing utility customers.

Our first speaker this morning with one plan to serve gas to Kern County was to be
Don Vial, President of the California PUC, who will be here.
San Francisco this morning.

His plane was late leaving

I understand the plane has probably landed at LAX and it will

be a little while before he gets here.

At this time, I also invite to the front of the

room the panel discussants who will be able to react to the various gas supply proposals
and raise pertinent questions.

The discussants represent the utilities, Energy Commission,

and oil companies.
So why don't we have the oil company representatives come up front here and also the
discussants, Mr. Gandara

Mr. Satrap, Fred John, Terry Thorn.

To begin with I've got to

have kind of a brief description and overview of what EOR is and how you think we should
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deal with it.

And gentlemen, please, we're late in starting so I'm going to ask all of

the persons speaking to not read long statements, tell us briefly what it is you want to
say so that we can move the hearing along.

If it appears that people are a little bit too

windy, I will be take the prerogative of the chair to shorten your presentation.
Joining us, Senator Barry Keene, a member of the committee.
missed anything except my opening remarks.

And so you haven't

All right, gentlemen, somebody, Don Reisner,

you want to introduce the persons who will tell us what EOR is?
MR. DON REISNER:
companies.

Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have with me today two witnesses:

representing Shell.

Don Reisner representing 11 oil

One representing Chevron and another

Witness Mr. Reichardt, Terry Reichardt will discuss from Chevron's

point of view what the EOR process is.

Mr. Knowles is here to answer any questions as

to how that process pertains to Shell.

There are obviously differences from one company to

the next.
thing.

They are slight so we're prepared to give you a little overview of the whole

This time I'd like to present Mr. Reichardt.

MR. TERRY REICHARDT:

Good morning.

My name is Terry Reichardt.

I am manager for

production engineering for the Western production region of Chevron, USA.
remarks I will comment briefly on what EOR is.

In my opening

I will discuss what the alternative--a

little bit of information on alternative fuels which will lead us to the conclusion, I hope,
that gas is a very desirable fuel for the EOR projects.

And I will talk a little bit

about what the producer requirements are for a satisfactory supply of gas for those
projects.
To begin with, what is EOR?

EOR stands for "enhanced oil recovery."

referred to a TEOR or "tertiary enhanced oil recivery."

It's sometimes

EOR applies to a number of

processes that are used to produce oil from reservoirs after primary recovery and/or conventional secondary recovery processes.
use of steam to recover heavy oils.

Included in the numerous EOR processes is the

Heavy oils are very thick and viscous at normal

reservoir temperatures. It is very difficult for those oils to flow through a reservoir
and into a producing well.

The fact that they are very viscous makes that flow difficult.

Sometimes there is no recovery at all through conventional producing means in recovering
heavy oils from reservoirs.
One of the methods that is used to encouarge the oils to flow through the reservoir
is the use of heat in the form of steam.
today.

That subject is what has brought us together

Senator Rosenthal earlier said that EOR is all about making heavy oils thin and

l very much agree with that view on the subject.

I kind of think of it as making oils

that behave almost like a solid into an oil that behaves much more like a liquid.

The way

a steam drive works is that steam is pumped through an injection well and into a producing
rock.

It has then the capability of heating up the very thick oils and make it easier for

them to flow, then the steam also provides pressure to displace the oils towards producing wells.
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some

of the fact

this

and

a

few statistics on Chevron s steam activities.
barrels of oil

We

processes.

gas

That is

are

an ambitious

activities,

It is our

and about 42 mill

cub

almost 100 million cubic feet of gas a
program to

increase our steam drive

.5 billion over 15 years.

to invest

to increase our
rels

about
fuel for that process

of oil per
feet

business, I'll

from the current 65

in the mid-1990s.

Our

barrels a day to about 180,000 bar-

The fuel that will be

for that expanded

in the mid-'90s will amount to around 200 million cubic feet a day.
that we have in progress
ive act

ies.

now is oriented towards conventional steam

In addition to what I've mentioned, we kind of have in the back of our

minds that the

will

be improved and advanced over the years so we

think that there s

for even greater

I'll now talk a little bit about the fuel situation.

ion.
Currently, the steam generators

convert water into steam are fired with either crude oil or natural gas.

Chevron

other fuels for that process, but when all factors are considered, items
environmental effect ,
alternatives at
for natural gas.

s, etc., it

current

turns out that there are

ime other than crude oil and natural gas.

Our

The economics are better with natural gas than with crude

il.

than those that

in

to put in generators that are fired

fired

crude oil.

that would be required

costs are also better for natural gas

generators.
of the

That is because natural gas is a clean
is not

the

natural gas

control

cost of

Th12 gas results in less air emissions.

I think

on crude fired

understands that the air

is substantial and we are concerned that if we

San

could be curtailed.

that our

The

associated with the gas fired generator also will allow additional
to be covered because of the more favorable economics.
In

gas to fire our generators, we have
need

commitment

ible service.

three items that are

two, we need a competitive price; and
commitment because EOR

We need a

a substantial capital investment and
have a life in

of 15 to 20 years.
ects, we need

is very

The
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In order to justify the

irm transportation supply in order to
or cost of running an EOR

ect is the

cost of the fuel to turn the water into steam.

We need a price at the burner tip that is

competitive with the price of burning crude oil.

We need a long-term assurance that

prices will be competitive with crude oil, again, in order to embark upon the major expenditures that are required.
a continuous process.

Third, we need uninterruptible service.

There are several detrimental things than can happen if interrup-

tions occur during the process.
can happen.

A steam drive is

When a steam injection well goes down, wellboard damage

We can have backflow from the formation into the well which would plug up the

well and result in decreased recoveries from the reservoir.

We also,when we have inter-

ruptions, have a period of time when the reservoir can cool down.

This will then take

additional heat to catch up after the process begins again and the economics, as I mentioned, are highly dependent upon the fuel costs so we don't like to have period when any
heat can escape or not be used in driving, in lessening the viscosity of the oil in
driving it to the producing wells.

And a third reason we need an uninterruptible supply

is that when we do have an interruption we do have reservoirs where the production will
drop dramatically, and when we do have interruptions in the production, that very adversely
effects the economics of the project.
So in conclusion, those are the three key requirements we have for gas in order to
find that to be a satisfactory long-term fuel for the EOR projects.

That concludes my

opening remarks on the EOR projects.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you.

Do you have anything to add which is significantly

different?
MR. DON KNOWLES:

No, I would like to comment primarily in terms of our gas require-

ments and that sort of thing that Mr. Reichardt---my name is Don Knowles, I'm with Shell
California in Bakersfield.
I would simply echo his comments as to the process, how it works.
well described for the committee this morning and in other forums.
spective, Shell's requirements, Shell

I think it's been

To put it into per-

California produces over 200,000 barrels of oil a

day in California, and of that 150,000 barrels

a day is produced in Central California,

primarily in Kern County.
Our EOR recovery process is the same as Mr. Reichardt described that of introduction
of heating the reservoir by way of steam generation.

We currently require 100 to 150 mil-

lion cubic feet per day of gas as fuel for our generators and we anticipate that that
requirement could increase to over 200 million cubic feet per day by 1990.
Again, the primary requirements that Mr. Reichardt set out are reliability of service,
uninterruptibility, cost competitive at the burner tip, because after all our truly alternative fuel is that of burning heavy crude.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL;

Yes, Senator Russell.

SENATOR NEWTON RUSSELL:

Will you get getting into the issue of why the current

system does not provide you with those kinds guarantees, prices and so forth?

-4-

MR. REISNER:

Senator, I think we will be available to respond to that after the

alternative methods of delivering the gas are described by the various projects.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Fine.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

I'll ask you now to

make the seats available to Terry Thorn, Vice President of Mohave Pipeline, Walter Gerlach
Vice President of PGC Interstate Transmission Company, and Jared Carter, Counsel to the
Kern River Gas Transmission Company.
Let me just throw out a question to the gentlemen from the pipelines which you might
be able to answer when you're making your presentation.

Why is it in the ratepayers'

interest to allow private pipelines serve the cream industrial EOR market?
MR. TERENCE H. THORN:

I left a rather dreary, chilly Fall day in Washington last

nigl1t to come to beautiful Southern California.

I don't know what you did with your

weather, but ...
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. THORN:

Liquid sunshine.

Let me briefly describe the Mohave Pipeline project.

said, my name is Terry Thorn.

As the Chairman

I am the Vice President of the Mojave Pipeline Operating

Company.
The Mohave

15

ect was filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on

985, as a

California.

purpose pipeline to transport natural gas to EOR fields in

It is 383 miles in length.

It originates in Topock, Arizona and will cost

$320 million to build.

I

like to dispell the notion that one morning the combined management of Mohave

ine woke up and decided to build an interstate pipeline into California.

Like any

of this magnitude, Mohave has been carefully thought out, was
in response to a market need, and its success or failure will depend on how
well

continues to meet the needsof its customers.
Now, what are these market needs?

You've heard from the producer panel.

makes sense to burn natural gas in these fields for two points:

Quickly, it

It's more efficient and

it solves some of the environmental problems associated with expanding this production.
, under the current regulatory scheme, burning more gas in these fields is not
for two reasons:
tailed

One, the

reliability of service--these

; and secondly, the fluctuation in price.

investments needed to

loads will be cur-

Right now, for the long-term type

these fields, the price assurity is just not there.

So to summarize then, without a reliable supply of gas at a predictable price,
EOR

have not been willing to risk the considerable investments required to

convert their EOR operations from burning portions of the oil produced to natural gas.
Mohave

was conceived and is positioned to receive gas from anywhere in North

America,to serve a single class of customers with no risk of curtailment, and to deliver
this gas at a very economic and very predictable rate.
Now a lot of things have happened in California, especially in the context of the
-5-

CPUC, and I was hoping that Mr. Vial would have preceded me.

The proposed transportation

program singles out EOR markets and there is actually probably five important parts of
this program that are especially targeted for this market--the 25 million cubic feet a
year requirement, the 3.5 cents per therm rate, five-year contract duration, 50 percent
take or pay requirements, and a promise to revisit the priority problem at a later date.
You have heard, well, you have not heard yet, but in reviewing the comments of the
EOR producers in response to the transportation order, they raised several problems.
it does nothing about the low priority status afforded that low.

One,

Two, future commissions

may modify what this commission does in protecting that market, and three, the price still
fluctuates too much, especially by tying it to the CPl.

The price of housing could go

up, therefore the cost of gas EOR fields could go up.
The consumer groups have raised other issues, in fact, a much broader issue where
they are asking that everyone carefully weight the benefits to consumers of utility
service to this market.

I think if you look at their comments it is not as clear cut as

people would maintain.

In other words, is it worth turning the entire regulatory scheme

in California on its head just to ensure that the EOR market is served by local utilities?
This might be the classic case of the tail wagging the dog.

I don't know.

The conclusion is that Mohave was conceived and is designed to serve a new incremental market for natural gas.

It offers firm price and reliable service.

It's objective

is not to capture markets whichthe utilities are best able to serve, but in the context of
today's markets and even under the new regulatory environment and the proposed order, we
believe there is still a need and a place for Mohave Pipeline.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

That concludes my comments.

Question, Senator Russell?

Just after deregulation took place there were attempts to nullify

contracts that had been developed during the scarcity period and work that out.

Now if

you have a long-term 20-year contract, how would those kinds of circumstances affect that
contract, or would they?
MR. THORN:

Well, Senator, they wouldn't.

regulatory scheme.
sell any gas.
move

We are a transporter of gas.

Mohave Pipeline is unique in the Federal
We will not buy any gas, we will not

The customer is the EOR producers who

purchase gas.

Whether they will

their own supplies from around the country into California or they will go into the

marketplace and buy gas, those contracts will be between them and the producing source.
We merely transport the gas so we don't have that contract problem.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, I understand that but you won't have a pipeline either if the

purchasers of this gas can't get some kind of an arrangement.

My question was for them--

maybe I'm directing it to the wrong person--how would those kinds of circumstances affect
the long-term contract because Southern California Gas Company was doing everything they
could and others to change those long-term contracts which when they were developed and
signed was the wisdom of the day, but things changed and they were trying to get out from
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under.

Is there such a thing as a 20-year guaranteed price?

Haybe I ought to ask

Southern California Gas or here, I'll ask this fellow over here.
MR. FRED JOHN:

Yes, Senator.

Mr. John?

As far as the price that would be set by the Public

Utilities Commission, obviously, that is subject to change.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. JOHN:

Under this scenario?

I think the scenario they're talking about, but it really should be left

to the producers, is I think what the producers are saying is they would have their own
that they've developed in other areas of the country, primarily the Southwestern
United States and possibly even Canada, and it would be those supplies that would enter
the San Joaquin Valley and the utility or the pipeline company would merely be the
transporters.

So it's different from a contract that a distributor like us would sign

with a pipeline company or produce.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

So if this pipeline is built and you buy from the producers---I

guess you wouldn't buy it either.
MR. JOHN:

I think what you've got to understand in this situation the producer often-

imes is also the customer.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

He's the end-user as well as the producer.

Okay, well, at the right time, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to find out

how permanent or how guaranteed is a 20-year contract under the fluctuating situations of
our economy and regulatory bodies, and so forth, whenever that comes up.
~m.

JOHN:

On that point, though, Senator, I think it should be noted and unfortunately

Commissioner Vial isn'

here to talk about his own decision, but I think what the Com-

mission's tried to do in their decision is establish a price to the EOR producer that will
luctuate in a minimal fashion, and it's a base rate and it's ties to fluctuations in
u

To say that there's going to be a price forever and that's it, I think
t

your question, and that's probably not in the scheme of things.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, if you say 20 years is in the scheme of things, okay.

I

don't think it's forever but ...
CHAIR¥~

ROSENTHAL:

Well, maybe we'll have an answer to that a little bit later.

another question that you might want to deal with.

Let

What are your intentions

non-EOR customers?
MR. THORN:
p

Mohave was conceived and was filed with the FERC as a single purpose

to serve just the EOR market.

There's no intention of the management to serve

any other load other than the producers associated with EOR.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. THORN:

Is there a guarantee of that?

As much as anything is guaranteed.

I might add that the partnership

agreement as drawn up between PacificLighting and El Paso Natural Gas and HNG Internorth
is that it would take a unanimous
EOR markets.

vote of the partners to serve any load other than

I think that ilyou look carefully at that partnership, I think that it

would not be likely as much as that is guaranteed that that unanimous vote would occur.
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CHAIRPAN ROSENTHAL:

Well, I guess, let me ask Pacific Lighting then.

If you used

your veto to block service to non-EOR customers, would you not be running afoul of the
antitrust laws?
MR. JOHN:

Senator, I don't want to beg the question, but I'm here representing

Southern California Gas Company.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. JOHN:

There will be a spokesman here tomorrow from Pacific Lighting Corporation

who can address any questions you have about Hohave.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

How about Hr. Thorn?

Could you answer that particular question?

From your viewpoint?
MR. THORN:

Well, from my viewpoint a management decision on how you run your

business, I guess that faces the same risk that the California Public Utilities

Cow~ission

would have legally in carving out a special rate or a special service to just the EOR
producers.

They have the same problem.

Would they end up in court?

To be honest, right

now l can't answer that.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

How about the---wouldn't you actually be competing then with

other lines coming into California which are now providing the oil companies with some of
the gas now?
MR. THORN:

That is our intent, to compete for this market.

You have to understand

that if we receive our certificate of approval in the Spring of 1987 that there's no
guarantee that the pipeline will be built.

We will look at the market conditions.

management will not decide if the pipeline is built.

My

EOR producers will decide if the

pipeline is built and if in the next 18 months they have signed significant contracts with
the existing utilities or with other pipelines, then we'll have to make the economic
judgment in 1987 that there's no long a place for Hohave.

We are here to compete for that

load and the marketplace will decide whether Hohave is built.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. JARED G. CARTER:

Okay.

Do you have anything further?

Yes, I do, Senator.

Kern River Gas Transmission Company.

Jared Carter is my name.

I'm representing

Perhaps in the absence of Commissioner Vial having

explained his proposal, it would be helpful for me before I start talking about our
proposal to just take a minute.

I gave each one of you a little map and if you open that

up it has transposed on it the various p
areas involved.

ines involved, as well as the various supply

The supply areas are the little hatched or dotted areas on the map.

At the present time, California is served by the pipelines running in along the
south from the supply areas in the south and the southwest that you see.

To a certain

extent you have PG&E's line, PGT, coming down from the Alberta area down through Washington and Oregon into California.

What Kern River proposes is the blue line that you see

which vJi ll hook up with Northwest Pipeline's exist

system that you see running from

the Washington area in a general southeasterly direction down to what's called the
San Juan Field

and it hooks up with British Columbia and Alberta Supply.
-8-

It also, and here's the distinctive feature

it, will hook into the large,

undedicated reserves in the area that you see there in the Rocky Mountains.

That's the

new feature that that
what the CPUC has done, and I understood the reason, the purpose for these
is that they've come out with a proposal to allow or to--it's dressed up as
allowing PG&E and Southern California Gas to pick up gas from El Paso and
Transwestern at the California border and transport it.
do now but

reasons behind their order was to keep an interstate pipe-

line out of California.
policy

state p

it as

transport it for a fee through their systems to the fields in Kern

One of the

further

That means they don't buy

In other words, what you have here is an attempt by the CPUC to

ectives of PG&E and Southern California Gas to keep out any inter-

from California, and their theory is, and I'm confident that they mean well,

is that that's

to be

allow the

for consumers because in the long-run no competition will

utilities to

the costs over their system to everyone's benefit.

I'm going to turn to my statement now and comment on this arrangement.
some

that I'm not

to read.

What we propose to do, as I

mentioned

I've submitted

It responds to the questions that you've asked.
is to build this line from Opal

Wyoming to

Bakersfield, California to transport to the EOR market gas from the prolific, undedicated
supplies in the Rocky Mountains.
nia.

Those

are not now being used to serve Califor-

're adequate to meet the demand of the EOR market and they are available on

terms

to the EOR

' needs.

it's our
natural gas will
the

of the EOR production by the use of

ion that

very substantial economic and environmental benefits for all of
California.

Those benefits can be realized, however, only if the gas
to the

system

can be implemented.

Kern River is the only

ect we believe can meet this test and by bringing competition and a new delivery
and new sources of
consumers

to the state, Kern River will benefit all of California's

not just EOR

, more than will any of the competing projects.

most

ec t

Let me

why

ion is not.

This

by the CPUC in it's October 17 order.
is valid and why the key points in favor of the

We

ect in response to the desires of the EOR pro-

ducers.

Those desires

have not changed.

In its comments on the October 17

order

the CPUC, Chevron, USA stated, and let me quote that, "Although there will
be situations where thermal EOR operators would find the proposal useful,"

that
needs

CPUC
EOR fuel.

, "it s
It

fails to provide satisfactory safeguards for the two

of supply

or

ive
s."

interstate p

not adequate as a comprehensive solution to the

, and it is thus not competitive with

That's the end of Chevron's quote.

We will continue to propose an interstate project if the producers continue to hold
these views.

An interstate

ect will be free from changeable CPUC

-9-

ions and

it will assure to all Californians the benefit of competition in the California marketplace.

This is an extremely important point.

The price benefits now available to all

U.S. gas consumers and the transportation service to be afforded California industrial
gas users under the CPUC's October 17 order are not likely to survive disappearance of the
current gas bubble unless continued competition is assured.
In the 1960s the U.S. Supreme Court made El Paso divest itself of the Northwest Pipeline Company because Northwest offered the possibility of interjecting needed competition
into the California gas market, but unfortunately, not until now has this potential been
real.

And in that same time period of the '60s, the California utilities and the CPUC

were successful in preventing Tennessee Gas from supplying California industrial users
with a dedicated and abundant supply of cheap gas.

Same arguments were used as are now

being used.
Not until the last few months, after an interstate line was proposed for the EOR
market, have the CPUC and the California utilities shown any sign of being responsive to
California industry.

If the threat or presence of an interstate line's removed again,

who's so naive to believe that the CPUC and the California utilities will continue to
demonstrate concern for the plight of California's industrial gas consumer?

Only the

Kern River project, and not the competing interstates, can adequately meet the needs of
the EOR market and connect California with new sources of supply under terms that will
assure this market the benefits of a reliable, reasonably priced gas supply for an
extended period of time.
The Mohave and El Dorado projects propose to supply the EOR market from southwestern
supply sources, which I've mentioned to you, that presently supply California and other
populated areas of the United States.
system.

You can see that from the gas pipeline distribution

When the current gas bubble has burst or sailed by, implementation of Mohave or

El Dorado would serve only to increase existing pressure for these supplies and it seems
unlikely that congressmen from the Midwest and the Northeast will sit idly by while
California satiates it's appetite for Southwest gas if a supply shortage exists.
Now the arguments made that the Rocky Mountains in Canadian gas can be delivered to
California by El Paso and Transwestern as cheaply and reliably as it can be delivered by
Kern River, but that's simply not true.

From the map that I've shown you, you can see

that the gas would have to travel a much greater distance if Kern River is not built.

The

facilities to carry the required volumes of gas from the Rockies to El Paso and Transwestern's line and over those lines to the California border do not now exist.

The line

of Northwest that comes down from where Kern River breaks off will now carry an excess of
around 50 to 75

million

cubic feet a day, and if we're trying to get an extra 350 or

500 down there, about $450 million is going to be required to expand it.
Moreover, it's simply not true that adequate volumes of Rocky Mountain and Canadian
gas can be exchanged for gas now going from the Southwest to the Midwest to obviate the
-10-

need

the Kern River

ec .

Let me now deal for a moment with the question of the
residential
based it

I know that's one

your

effect on

or issues.

The CPUC has largely

order on the assumption that intrastate transportation will benefit ratepayers

by

an interstate line out of California.
intentions, but we

its

We don't doubt, as I mentioned, their

is flawed and its efforts to thwart Kern

River is
First

the CPUC's assumption that the utilities and their suppliers can serve the

EOR market with their

is

not true and this has been admitted by

PG&E, Mohave, and the chairman of Pacific
either

to the FERG

Second

statements to their shareholders.

the CPUC has failed to consider the question of who will pay for unneeded

of their util
their
go

ing in formal documents that they have

system.

capac

If Kern River is certificated and implemented and

is not needed, obviously, the exist

residential ratepayers are

to pay for those unnecessary
Third, the CPUC has failed to address adequately whether California's traditional

sources

supply are

to meet California's long-term needs.

, and I think

, the CPUC has blinders on when it comes

to the question whether competition in the state gas market will benefit all of the
cit

of this state

residential ratepayers.

is good.

it doesn't
In any event

committee will avoid

Perhaps the CPUC thinks that

understand that it's really a part of the

we believe that it's wrong and we hope that this

its lead.

In response

Kern River's intent to serve other industrial

, we

that

from the utilities

If those customers receive adequate service

ter Kern River is built, perhaps the question whether we should later

seek tha

never arise.

Let me leave you with an additional thought and a request.
be
which
Cal

ects to

ected to a

Our project and other

environmental study before FERC decides

In the course of that

, which will be conducted by the

State Lands Commission pursuant to a memorandum agreement with the FERC, one
the alternatives to be studied will be the

October

7 order.

in its

assumed up until now that the State Lands Commission will do an

unbiased

ob of this

and that the CPUC will cooperate to determine the

environmental effects of all alternatives fac
issue

ect CPUC proposes to

the state in this most fundamental and

of energy
ine how surprised we were to receive comments, dated November 13, from

the State Lands Commission to the FERC

the October 17 order. to learn that the

State Lands Commission says that an interstate p
intrastate facilities are

is not necessary because existing

to serve the EOR market.
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And not one single word

about the environment or the question of whether the CPUC has done any environmental study.
We're raising these issues with the CPUC and the
being made today.
Long ago, Mr. Chairman, sponsors of Kern River had to endorse, and willingly did so,
the concepts that monopolies are bad and concern for the environment's good.

Apparently,

some state agencies, at least the CPUC and segments of the Lands Commission, have not come
this far.

They seem to believe that monopoly is good and concern for the environment is

unnecessary.

Our request to you is to help us convince them otherwise.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you.

Let me ask the discussants, i f you will, tell us how the pipe-

lines will affect your interest and raise some questions that might be on your mind so that
we can have some cross discussion here.
SENATOR BARRY KEENE:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:
sented.

Senator, is i t possible to ask some clarifying questions?
Yes, yes.

All right.

Senator Keene.

Just some clarifying questions on the testimony that was just pre-

It seems to me you've made out a very powerful case for competition and I would

hope that it produces some response that joins the issue so that we can more fully understand it.

I'm looking at your map here and can't help but noticing that through the

creative selection of pinpoints, your pipeline is much thicker than all the others that
are shown there.
MR. CARTER:

We weren't sure the color would make it stand out enough by itself.

[Laughs.]
SENATOR KEENE:

My question goes, though, my serious question goes to the fact that

the magenta, I think that's what it's called, colored pipeline designated in the legend,
the Williams Company pipelines, either connects up at the San Juan River or practically
connects up with the red pipeline that then moves westward into California.
MR. CARTER:

Yes.

SENATOR KEENE:

While the route is not as direct as the one that you propose, it

appears to be an already constructed, existing or almost existing connection.

Why would

that not be preferable to the one that you're proposing for that reason?
i'1R. CARTER:

Perhaps an argument could be made that it would, Senator Keene, if it

would carrv anywhere near the needed volume.
understarrling

There's excess capacity in that line.

My

to the effect it's somewhere in the neighborhood between 50 and 100 million

a day, and what you're looking at is we propose to carry initially 700 million with easy and
ready economical expansion up to 1 billion more.

Now, you simply can't carry anywhere

near the volumes we're talking about over that Northwest pipeline route down to the San
Juan Feel to hook off with the El Paso or Transwestern system without spending at least
spending $450 million.
lay.

Our total project is going to be 825, including the California

By the time that you expand all of the systems necessary to deliver this gas from

the Rocky Mountain area down through Northwest's system and then through the existing
systems to the California border, and fromthe California border to the Bakersfield market,
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it is our belief
cost

our

total

and we're
is

to deal with that in test

to be substant

before FERC, that the

less and therefore, substantially less of a

to whatever consumers benefit from that gas.
We all know

and that

that the shortest distance between two
even when you re

SENATOR KEENE:

The

is a

gas pipelines.
distance.

The other question I had relates to the

operative features of the PUC order that you say would effect
~1at

private interstate p

p

line

and the other part of the

exclude interstate

are the operative features of that order,

it

, and have you

, and that

sort

MR. CARTER:
state line.

None of the

of their order would

don't have the authority to do that.

preclude an inter-

Federal law will preempt the state

law and the FERC could license an interstate line regardless of what the PUC says.
in their order itself, the PUC said the reason we're
prevent the implementation of an interstate p

lock it in

oppose any

this order is to thwart or
and it s rather apparent that their

the tactic of SoCal Gas and PUC is to

tact

the service to the oil companies,

of the interstate line by drawing out proceedings
You know much

and if necessary, by, I would assume, legal

inertia on your side, you are 95 percent of the way

better than I that once you've
home.

'm

So

But

to make to this committee is don't fall into that trap that
service into the area

's thwart an interstate line and

systems so that we never have an interstate line."
any interim benefits that the

We'

are going to get

for any other industrial customers getting those benefits, but
next step.
to stand in the shoes of the PUC and they're

, but I'm

SENATOR

that we know what there is and

1

re attempting to deal

t know what there might be, we know there are a lot of proposals but
be out there,
make

for these purposes, we'

be your

that kind of

if we fail to act on what there is to
our job as the PUC.

What would

d say you're too generous because their words belie that generous
, "We know what there is and we know what there can be and let's stop
ine."

an

This is a conscious
line.

mentation
tion in

the CPUC to stop the

They don't want any competition or threat of competi-

ifornia.
KEENE:

CHAIR~~~

Thank you very much.

ROSENTHAL:

SENATOR RUSSELL:
are

decision

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Senator.
to

I wanted to ask a

to capsulize

my understanding,

for this field is such that the existing

the need for gas
-1

supply lines that now exist cannot serve that without some additional expansion, and you
mentioned $450 million?
MR. CARTER:

No.

Is that what you're saying?
The $450 million was in response to a slightly different question.

I am saying, though, that the initial market of 700,000 cubic feet per day, 700 million,
cannot be met through the existing facility and certainly, the projected 1.1 billion cubic
feet per day, which everyone estimates is the market, cannot be met and that Mohave has
recognized that in its application, the ...
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, okay, I think you've answered my question.

So what we're

saying then is that to get gas for this purpose, there will have to be an expansion or
construction of a new facility or expansion of existing ones?
MR. CARTER:
SEN~TOR

Yes, sir.

RUSSELL:

And what we're talking about is gas specifically and only from your

pipeline for this project?

Is that correct?

You're not going to be selling it, using the

pipeline to branch off and to serve other California consumers?
MR. CARTER:

That's the authority we've sought, Senator.

Is that correct?
We've made no commitment

that we're not going to branch off and if five years from now the other industrial consumers are still being subjected to a discriminatory pricing formula for transportation
or purchase by the CPUC, I would assume they would come to us and to the FERC and say,
"We need some more authority."
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Okay, Mr. Chairman, I would think that during the course of this

hearing that we try to understand what, as I think one of your early questions was to
determine what costs are going to be addressed by forcing it to go through the existing
system, and what increased costs to the other consumers will occur by building a new
system.

I assume it addresses just those fixed costs of having a pipeline there, whether

it's empty or full of gas, there's certain costs of maintaining that and that's part of
the cost the consumer pays.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Yes, I'd like to ask utilities who have a different concept of

the problem to respond so we can have some cross discussion here.
that you can't do it, so somebody else should do it.
MR. FRANK MORRIS:

You've heard him say

Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, my name is Frank Morris.

I'm the Industrial/Commercial Markets Services Manager of Southern California Gas Company.
With your indulgence I'd like to touch on four points very quickly.
describe the size of the market we're dealing with.
existing utilities to serve that market.

First, I'd like to

Secondly, the capacity of the

Just briefly, the EOR customers' concern with

respect to taking service from the existing utilities, and then a need for a transportation tariff in the State of California.
The size of the market you may have heard described at being the largest on the North
1\nu.:rlc<lll ContJnelll.

lL 's est imuteJ to be ubl)ul

1 billion cublc

l evL

ol

g:tH

per day.

today's rates that would convert to about $1 billion a year in annual revenue.
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The

AL

utilities in California, Southern California Gas Company and Pacific Gas and
Electric, current have in place facilities capable of serving the entire estimated potential load of the EOR requirements in the San Joaquin Valley.
alone has

the capability of

Southern California Gas

450,000,000 cubic feet of gas per

, and

we have under contract right now 250,000,000 cubic feet of gas to be served to the EOR
customers in San Joaquin Valley, an additional 85,000,000 for EOR related cogeneration
loads.
We have for many years served the San Joaquin Valley, the Southern San Joaquin
We have an extensive distribution system and transmission system capable of
that gas up there.

In addition to that, PG&E has two major transmission lines

directly through the area, so the existing facilities are in place without any major
capital investment to serve the entire projected load.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

On that point, Senator Russell.

The ultimate 1 billion, whatever it was, you can serve that?

You

can serve the initial 700,000,000 need?
MR. MORRIS:

Let me give you a breakdown ..•

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. MORRIS

Just say yes or no.

Yes, we can.

SENATOR RUSSELL
MR. MORRIS:

You can.

We can serve the entire projected ...

SENATOR RUSSELL:
is that correct?
MR. MORRIS:

Do I understand it?
Yes.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. MORRIS:

That's in direct contradiction to what this gentlemen has said,

Thank you.

The load of 1.2 billion cubic feet that was referred to by Mr. Carter

includes some load that is going to be served by gas that is produced in the area and is
not, therefore, gas that would be subject to either service by the utilities or an out of
state pipeline.

There is gas produced in the area that would be used in enhanced oil

recovery and there is a certain amount of equipment that will always burn oil because of
its location, because of backup needs, and so forth.
served by a p

or the utility company is closer to 900,000,000 cubic feet of gas a

SNEATOR RUSSELL:
MR. MORRIS:

So the actual load that has to be

Ultimately or initially?

These estimates are based m the projected expansion as of 1990.

Now

in association with the EOR load, which is the production of oil, there is cogeneration
potential.

The cogeneration potential is, of course, much more efficient to operate.

As

a result, it displaces the need for some of the heat that would be required in the EOR
operation.
the

The actual EOR requirements, based on DOG production figures in the fields and
ion figures of the various suppliers or operators in the fields of up there, is

about 650,000,000 cubic feet a day of pur EOR requirement, an additional 250,000,000 cubic
-15-

feet per day is EOR cogeneration related load, for a total of about 900,000,000 cubic feet
a day.

That is what the market is.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
into

So that the figures of the 1.2 that was mentioned did not take

consideration the cogeneration?

Did not take into consideration the amount of gas

that's there already in that community, but the total amount needed by the companies there
for their EOR?

Is that what you said?

MR. MORRIS:

The total amount of gas required for EOR operations and cogeneration

amounts to about 1.2 billion; 300,000,000 of that will be supplied either in the area by
oil or by locally produced gas, and the market that would be supplied by the utility
companies or an outside pipeline is about 900,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Now that would indicate to me that since you have facilities

which are able to deliver more gas than we are now delivering, what's the cost for maintaining such an excess capacity tothe ratepayers right now?

MR. MORRIS:

That is one of the areas that I wanted to touch on.

There has been some

discussion about whether it would be to the advantage of existing ratepayers for us, for
the California utilities to serve that load and I think that the fact that we have capacity,
both PG&E and ourselves, that is not being utilized is an answer to that question.

Any

of that capacity that is utilized as a result of serving this market is going to benefit

all of the ratepayers in California.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

Senator Keene.

May I ask a question on that point?

You have an unutilized capacity

of 900,000,000?
MR. MORRIS:

We, Southern California Gas Company, has an unutilized capacity right

now of 450,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day that we could use, we could serve in the
San Joaquin Valley.
SENATOR KEENE:

PG&E has something in excess of that, about the same equivalent load.
So you're saying that together your unutilized capacity will be able

to meet the needs?

MR. MORRIS:

Together, the unutilized capacity will exceed the market requirements

projected for EOR in the San Joaquin Valley.
SENATOR KEENE:

And if at that point there is growth in California, an increase in

demand for natural gas and all of the unutilized capacity has been used, what happens?

MR. MORRIS:
thing.

An existing gas distribution system and transmission system is a living

It grows and is added to as loads need to be served, as communities are built and

pipelines need to be extended in to serve those communities, those pipelines are extended
in.
SENATOR KEENE:

I'm talking about the main branches of the pipeline.

I take it that

that's where the capacity has its limitations.
MR. MORRIS:

WeJl, i t has its limitations to the degree that we have more capacity

available between the two systems than is going to be needed to serve the EOR requirements
in the San Joaquin Valley.

Now you must recognize that all of the expansion on the PG&E
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system or on the SoCal

is not going to be

in the San Joaquin Valley.

Our

distribution system runs all the way from the Mexican border to the San Joaquin Valley.
s

very

system.

SENATOR KEENE:
the force of

Well, if
ion

after you've met the Kern

needs

just

there is an increased need for natural gas, it seems to me

that you have to build another

or PG&E would have to build another pipeline, or

Kern River would have to build another pipeline, or somebody would to serve existing needs
because you will have utilized all of the available pipeline space.

MR. MORRIS:

There is more capacity in other parts of the system.

the capacity specifically to serve the San Joaquin Valley.
serve

I am talking about

There is more capacity to

County, or in the case of PG&E, I would assume to serve the San Francisco
We're talking about capacity that is available right now, without any major capital

investment, to serve the San Joaquin

That's to get gas from the California border

the San Joaquin Valley.
SENATOR KEENE:

MR. MORRIS:
excess.

How long have you had this

excess capacity?

This capacity has been there for some period of time.

It's not always

It's a matter of where development is taking place, where loads are developing,

way you shift the gas from one part of your system to another part of your system.
SENATOR KEENE:

MR. MORRIS:

Well, my question still is how long have you had the unused capacity?

This capacity was designed into the system when it was built.

SENATOR KEENE:
. MORRIS

For what purpose?

With Kern County in mind or something else in

think the--and I was not involved in the initial design of SoCal's or

's system, but that gas is brought in from out of the state a long way away to serve
the entire State of California and it was done some 40 years ago.
SENATOR KEENE:

Why wouldn't utility consumers say that that's an example of excesof pipeline capacity?

ive investment and

MR. MORRIS:

I don't think it was a case of overbuilding.

for

It was a case of expecting

expansion in the California market which has taken place.

It

market and the largest natural gas market in the country.

has been a regular

, but now the argument is that if interstate pipelines were to

SENATOR KEENE:

in, private interstate p

were to come in, that would be a poor investment in

the future unlike the investment that was made 40 years ago by Southern Cal Gas Company
for sufficient excess to accommodate

MR. MORRIS:
is that

I'm not

to say that that is a poor investment.

What I am saying

we have a system in and paid for that is capable of serving the rethat are up there.

Whether it's

to

in another pipeline for some

future load that may materialize or not is a question for someone else.
SENATOR KEENE:

But isn't that your argument in favor of the PUC order that it is an

ustifiable additional investment when you have the capacity and ultimately the con-
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sumer will have to pay for that investment?
MR. MORRIS:

That's not your argument?

I think you have to look at two things, Senator.

certain underutilized capacity in the system.
onyour system to use that capacity?

One is you've got

Is it more cost effective to the customers

Assuming all that capacity is fully utilized, I think

the next question you have to raise is, is it more cost effective to build incrementally on
your existing utility system, or is it more cost effective to allow another system to be
built?

The point Mr. Carter kept making which I feel needs some response, the concept

kept being talked about was a private interstate pipeline.
private interstate pipeline when you go to the FERC.

There's no such thing as a

FERC has to determine whether it's

in the public convenience and necessity, or the public interest to build a brand new interstate pipeline.

What you also have to realize is there are two interstate pipelines

presently serving Southern California:

El Paso; and Transwestern.

So what the PUC and

the utilities are doing is saying to the FERC, "In reaching your decision as to what's in
the public interest, you have to recognize that there are existing distribution
ties within the State of California that can serve this market."

facili-

That's, you know, and

when people talk about competition versus monopoly, I think the point Chairman Rosenthal
made at the beginning, everybody talked about telephone competition as the be all and the
end all.

I think we have some question marks today as to whether that unfettered compe-

tition is in the overall public interest, especially of the high priority customers.
SENATOR KEENE:
mine.

[Laughter.]

I assume somebody's question just got answered, but it really wasn't
I guess my question still is, 40 years ago--we're dealing a little

loosely with the factual situation, I understand, but sometime ago you built in some
unused capacity on the theory there would be additional growth.
maybe it wasn't.

Maybe that was prudent,

It may turn out to be prudent if that unused capacity is utilized here

for the transmission to Kern County.

On the other hand, on the other hand, you're now

arguing, it appears to me, that there should not be additional capacity here, an additional pipeline should not be built because that would burden the consumers ultimately and
it's not an appropriate investment.

If that's not it, I wish you would tell me what is

it because I'm trying to understand your argument.
MR. GENE SATRAP:
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. SATRAP:

I really am and I haven't ...

Senator, may I try?
Yes.

My name is Gene Satrup with Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

a quick background I am its manager for gas supply management.

Just for

That responsibility is to

purchase gas in California, the Rocky Mountains and mid-continent, as well as to deal
with these producers to sell gas into the enhanced oil recovery market here in Kern County,
as well as in Fresno County and Monterey County where we deal in the San Ardo Oil Field,
and the Coalinga Oil Field.
I'd like to try to answer your question, Senator, by saying that the PG&E system,
and I'm restricting my comment to the PG&E system, was built to serve the San Francisco
Bay region.

About three-fifths of PG&E's market is in the San Francisco area.
-18-

There was

not spare capacity put on those p
our mains, 300a and 300b.

that I'm assuming are on your map that depict

What happened was the cost of gas became so prohibitive and it

as a resource became scare that industrial customers left the PG&E system for alternate
fuel,

And that developed the capacity that is available today.
Planned conservation assisted us gaining additional capacity on that main system.

We don't believe that

traditional marketing we will recover the sales to fill

lnes as we
and

in the '40s, and '50s, and early '60s, so that the PG&E system,

'm assuming the same for Southern California Gas Company through its management, did

not overbuild projecting or anticipating loads.
to get back full capacity.

They lost loads and now we're attempting

The purpose being to spread the fixed costs of these systems

over greater units sold, therefore, reducing costs to all of our ratepayers.
SENATOR KEENE:

I

understand that part of the position.

Is the other part of it then,

is the corollary to that that you do oppose, therefore, investment and other so-called
out-of-state pipelines, which are incorrectly called "private out-of-state" pipelines, according to the witness.

But whatever they're called, whatever you choose to call

you do oppose them and the additional capacity they would create because it would
undercut this position that you've just taken?
MR. SATRAP:

Yes, sir.

Our opposition to the interstate pipelines revolves on the

fact that the capacity available between PG&E and SoCal systems collectively, can be used
to serve this market through transportation.
Okay, I understand that then and that answers that question.

SENATOR KEENE:

What

to go around two sides of a triangle and the additional

about the question of your

associated with that as compared with Kern County and this map that I have in front
River, rather, and this map that I have in front of me?

of

Not you, not PG&E,

rather Southern California Gas.
MR. JOHN:

I'm somewhat at a disadvantage, Senator, since I don't have the map.

him map.]

I

Mountain gas and I

think that goes back to the question of access to the Rocky

think the assumption that Kern River's made is that their route is the

direct and cheapest way of getting that gas into California.

I

think that's some-

that PG&E might want to comment on more than us since that line also ties back into
Canada and I

think PG&E can indicate that it has the ability to get Canadian or Rocky

Mountain gas through its own util
• SATRAP:

Thank you, Fred.

comment about the unavailabil
SENATOR KEENE:

Wait.

I'd like to start by commenting on Mr. Carter's

of Rocky Mountain gas .•.

Would you start by responding to my question?

I

know you

and I don't want to defer your presentation except that I'll under-

have a

better once

stand your
MR. SATRAP:
I can

system .

understand your position.

Not understanding the engineering of the proposed Kern River pipeline,

say that that route was selected for the business purposes of that company.

We don't understand that particular route as being anymore efficient method by which
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Rocky Mountain Gas or Canadian Gas can flow to California.

I don't know the reason for

the selection of the route.
SENATOR KEENE:

The distances look shorter than the distances over which the gas would

have to travel to get to Kern County through the other pipelines.
MR. SATRAP:

Shorter, yes, sir, but if I understand from that ...

SENATOR KEENE:

I'm interested in the costs associated with that.

As a lay person

I'm interested in the costs associated with that.
MR. SATRAP:
pipelines.

If I understand the map, some of those other lines appear to be existing

Pipelines in place that could be expanded on an incremental basis so that I

think you'd have to compare what the cost is to expand an existing line with a brand new
line and I'm ...
SENATOR KEENE:
it.

I understand that and I'm not focusing, therefore, on that portion of

I'm focusing rather on the cost of moving the gas from the fields where the gas

exist; the hatched areas over to Bakersfield.
MR. SATRAP:

If I may try, yes, moving gas in its most direct route is least expen-

sive for the fuel that's required to move it, or the loss of inventory that you have in the
moving of that gas.

The reason this route was selected, I don't know if that was one of

the governing criterias in it or not.
SENATOR KEENE:
respond

Okay.

I'm familiar with what the planning criteria was.

My final question is a general one and you may choose to

in the course of your overall presentation or in recapitulating at some point,

but as Ear as the consumer is concerned it seems to me there is an underlying issue of
whether the benefits of monopoly outweight the detriments of the loss of competition.

In

this situation, in this particular situation and I understand the reasons for monopoly
in the utility industry generally--would you at some point address that issue of whether
the purchaser benefits by competition or loses through the loss of advantages of monopoly
if you allow these other pipelines to come in.

It's an underlying question for me in the

scale as to which way it tips so I would hope that you could address that in some definitive way.

Thank you.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRNAN ROSENTHAL:

Any other comment?

Mr. Gandara.

MR. ARTURO GANDARA:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and committee.

the invitation on behalf of the Energy Commission.

I appreciate

At the same time I'd like to clarify

that my comments are my own since we don't have any prepared testimony and, therefore,
the Commission has not necessarily reviewed it and/or approved it, And also let me say
that I was assigned this seat--I do not sit here because I'm opposed to interstate pipelines or because I support the utility proposals or the gas distribution situation, nor
do I disfavor them.
What

I would like to do in terms of my conunents since it was conmnHlicatl'd to

Till'

in

my invitation was to assist the committee in its consideration and deliberation of this
issue is to perhaps back up a little bit and ask what I consider to be some fundamental
questions that any public policymaker has to deal with and the first one is to ask
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whether one has come to a conclusion that we want more oil produced?

We have started

off with the assumption that we're going to burn gas to produce more oil and I think
there's a real fundamental question, do we need more oil produced at this time, both in
terms of the national interest and/or in terms of the benefits to California?
I refer to oil because oil and gas are inexplicably linked.

Their pricing is linked

and that there is an assymetry that curiously develop when we look at oil and gas.

Oil

we tend to look in terms of national interest, and gas we tend to look in terms of the
state.

So the first question is do we want more oil produced?

lowest it's been in many years.

The price of oil is the

Our projections indicate that oil prices at the crude

level will continue to decrease.

That it will take at least ten years for oil prices to

even come back to the point where it is right now.
We have a situation at the national level where the President has authorized the
export of oil, of coconut oil from Alaska to Japan.

We have a situation where the filling

of the petroleum reserve has been limited to about 500,000,000 barrels instead of the
expected 750,000,000 barrels.
produced?

So in the large strategic picture, do we want more oil

If we look at the reasons sometimes given for the producing of more oil, it is

that we wish to displace foreign imports.

If we look at the history of where the

of foreign imports has come from, we find that 70 percent of foreign imports
have been displaced by conservation, 20 percent ...
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. GANDARA:

Seventy percent.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. GANDARA:
percent has been

How many percent?

Yes.

Seven-zero?
Twenty percent has been displaced for alternative fuels.
by increased domestic production.

Ten

That's on a national scale.

Of that 10 percent increased domestic production, if we were to increase to burn all the
gas we could and increase all the production we could from the Kern County oil field,
would we

a significant amount of gas that would figure--a significant amount of

oil that would displace in terms of meeting those national goals or not?
In any case, that begs the fundamental question.

Is a displacement of oil at this

in time in our nation's history in the best interests of the country?
not

Should we

reconsider whether this may be the best of all times to purchase oil?

are some who argue that that in fact may be the case.

There

With an excess of production

capacity to actual production in the Middle East close to 10,000,000 barrels per day,
with OPEC in disarray there is considerable thought that in fact the increased production
would not increase purchases of imports might in fact produce any upward pressure on
prices.
The second big question that I would ask is if, nonetheless, we come to the conclusion that we do want more oil produced domestically and that if we do want that oil to
be produced from the Kern County oil fields in particular in California, the question is
do we want more gas consumed to produce that oil, because that's what we're embarking on.
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We're embarking on a gas consumption policy unless we talk just about EOR in Kern County.
There's also, as was brought out in some of the questioning that there will be increasing
demand from cogeneration itself that's non-EOR

because of the state policies

that have promoted it in the past, as well as PURPA (Public Utilities Regulating Policy
Act o

1978), and also there s residential and commercial consumption of gas that will be

increasing.

So the question will be:

projected demand and supp

will there be enough gas in the future?

and demand/supply in balance?

What is the

So there's that fundamental

question, do we want to burn gas to produce oil to be able then to produce gasoline and go
that circuitous route?
One of the--of course, there may be many reasons why you want more oil produced and
why you may want gas to result or to feed that production.

One of the ones that was given

that 1 would at least like to balance the comment out is that the benefit that has been
given that I heard was that it is environmentally beneficial.

There is no doubt that per

btu that if you burn gas rather than oil, you wind up with less emissions.

But if we

really look at what's happening in the Kern County area and you look at the air pollution
permits, we're looking essent

at air pollution levels.

And so what we're talking is

about increasing efficiency, that is there won't necessarily be an environmental benefit
as a result of less emissions because the production will increase to the level that will
in fact wind up having no particular offset.

I may be wrong, but I know of no proposals

that says, "If you let us burn gas, we will reduce our overall levels by 25 percent," or
anything like that.

The whole idea is that you do gain efficiency because you can produce

more oil per pound of pollution, but the pounds of pollution will likely remain the same.
While if you do decide that you do want to burn gas to produce oil, then what are the
options and the pros and the cons?
you're doing today.

For that you really are doing the right thing, what

What are stakes and who wins and who loses?

restructure markets without redistributing benefits and burdens?

Can you realistically
The answer to that

obviously, is no, but the assumption should not be made that the current structure is the
fairest.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. GANDARA:

Could you say that again?

I didn't--could you repeat that?

Yes, what I was saying is that I don't believe you can restructure

markets without redistributing benefits and burdens, but the assemption should not also be
made that, therefore, you do not disturb this current situation because I would assume
that the current situation would be the fairest.
The issue that I see thatyou have focused on is control versus gas price competition, and that is who controls and can it be maintained?
that interstate

It has already been mentioned

lines have Federal preemption, therefore, we realistically ask what

actually can be done by the state and/or by a state legislature to limit, if it were to
desire to do so, an interstate pipeline?

Well, the protections and involvements can be

long and lengthy and perhaps something could be done, but the fact of the matter is that
the Federal preemption, it would be a way by which certainly control would be limited,
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and that's what we see in the

here.

On the other hand, there is gas price competition that is being experienced in other
parts of the country and would there be benefits whereby it would be a better risk for
California to introduce some gas
And, in fact

competition or some more, not that it's absent.

deal with a little bit loss of control.

I'd like to state here that I don't

think the issue really is whether it's an issue of the PUC proposal versus the interstate

P

it'

both.

If you

are talking about bringing competition to bear

on the market, it does seem that the multiplication of
benefit the gas

in competition.

the

and sellers would

Here in California, as you know, we have some of

rates in the country.

We have that because we have some of the

costs of fuel input, that is both gas and oil, and the situation could very well
be that the increased gas price competition would have beneficial effects in being able
to restructure all those markets.
in the

direction.

And that's to say that the PUC proposal would be a step

Whether everybody is

with it or not is another issue.

That

also doesn't mean that that should preclude any other competition from entering the

In fact, I would be more concerned about
of the
that

so

than I would be about the

many

prospects for the limitations

ion of the sellers and that is to say

, in fact, the purchase of gas

the pipelines is going to be limited to

EOR purposes, then does the ratepayer care what interstate pipeline it is?
certain that should be the case.

I'm not quite

That would, in fact, be discriminatory application

benefits to California, if there is benefit from gas price competition.
bit of

that you should look at.

From the other
situation

of

we have had

of course, an insulated gas distribution

many years and you can ask the question whether that has benefitted the

state from the

of view of gas

competition.

like to kind of end my initial comments by also leaving you with an

I

additional

that when you look at it from the point of view of gas price competithe EOR market at all?

is
demand were

ion of

ine or not?

Would there still be a benefit toward having a multi-

and sellers, having more buyers to

So the arguments could be
I

I mean, if you were to assume that

be constant and supply were to be constant, would there still be a benefit

to an interstate p

them.

So that's

pressure in the marketplace?

of course, many on both sides and I think you've heard all of

t think that you will have an easy time of resolving these issues in your

mind, but I d like to raise at least those considerations to you because I think
very fundamental
where we started.

are

and at least several of them back up two steps, I think, from
So with that, I would be pleased to try an answer any of the questions

that you all may have.
CHAIR!'1AN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Any further comment?

I have a question of Mr. John.
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

All right.

We've been talking about fixed costs and can you tell me when a

consumer buys "x" amount of gas, what percentage of that is attributed to fixed costs
and what is attributed to the cost of the gas?
MR. JOHN:

Okay.

At the present time, out of every--and I'm only talking about

Southern California Gas Company now--out of every dollar of revenue, approximately 75 percent goes to the cost of gas and approximately 25 percent is fixed costs; and when I'm
talking about fixed costs that includes labor, nonlabor costs, taxes to the government,
and your return on investment.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Then are you saying that that would, then if you have a less supply

of gas going through, the portion of those costs, fixed costs would increase?

Or the

portion would be the same but I guess the dollar value would increase?
MR. JOHN:

I think the real impact is how do you allocate those fixed costs that are

not being picked up by certain customers and I think that's the real key here.

If you've

got more customers on your system you can spread those costs over a larger base, thereby
putting a lesser burden on those customers remaining on the system.

If you don't have

those increased customers, or if you lose customers--for example, right now Southern
California Gas Company is serving a fair amount of load to EOR and cogeneration.

If we

lost those customers, those fixed costs that they're presently picking up would have to be
spread elsewhere and that was the point that Gene Satrap was making earlier.
problems in the late '70s and early '80s was as the price of gas increased

What created
and oil prices

decreased, customers left the system and those fixed costs had to be spread.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, your fixed costs as it relates to manpower and workers, and

so forth, you have less gas to supply, you need probably less workers.

If you have more,

you mean to say you have the same number of, same fixed costs when the pipeline was first
built and you had this tremendous excess capacity?
MR. JOHN:

You see what's happening right now, Senator, is we're still adding a sub-

stantial number of customers a year.

Right now we have little over 4 million customers.

You still have to go out and serve those customers, especially the residential; and of
our 4 million customers, 3.8 million of them are residential, so you still have to---I'll
give you one example.

Within the last two weeks we've had some early cold weather in

Southern California and so we had a lot of calls from our residential customers to come
out and turn on their pilot lights.

That's going to occur whether you have more or less

gas going through your system, and it takes people and money to do that.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

The 75/25, was that the same ratio when the system was first

built that had this tremendous excess capacity?
MR. JOHN:
excess capacity.

It's varied and I want to go back to that point.

It was not tremendous

When you build a pipeline, you build some excess into it so that you're

not having later on to go in and expand that on a non-cost effective basis.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I understand that.
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JOfu~:

MR.

But the reason for the excess is more recent,

as

Mr. Satrap point out,

because of conservation and because of fuel switching because of oil prices.
ago, for
costs.

example, it was about a

But 10 years

ratio between your cost of gas and your fixed

Three years ago it was about 85 percent cost of gas and 15 percent fixed costs, so

the price of gas has gone down but not nearly to the point it was 10 years ago.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
hazard

Forty years ago when the system was first built, would you care to

a guess as to what the ratio was?

MR. JOHN:

I was just a thought in my parents mind at that time.

I don't want to

hazard a guess.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Somebody in the company would know, I suppose.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

Okay, thank you.

Senator Keene.

Along the same lines, are fixed costs a function of volume or

in any way?

MR. JOHN:

As I said earlier, you still have the fixed cost of operating your system

no matter how much gas is going through it because the pipeline is still there, it's got
to be

and maintained,

the customers still have to be served.

Where the problem

arises is if you have less customers on your system taking gas, it's how you spread those
costs among those customers and that's the whole issue today in the world of rate design,
is how do you allocate the remaining fixed costs of operating your system among your
residential versus commercial versus industrial versus wholesale customers.
SENATOR KEENE:
, or

Without regard to that allocation, but with regard to the amount,
of gas that moves through a pipeline at a given time, there is virtu-

no effect on fixed costs?
JOHN
certain

I think if you get to a point where there is no gas running through a
for an extended

abandon

system, that p

of time, you have to make a decision as to whether
system.

If you do, obviously, you need less

people to operate that portion.
SENATOR KEENE:
JOHN:

What if it's reduced by half?

A lot

on how
of

sense to abandon a

you will see that reduction.

system if the loss of market is only temporary

which is what we've faced in he last
SENATOR KEENE:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

years.

It's been a temporary a loss of market.

Thank you.
It seemsto me that with the growth of

I ask another

California as you project in the future, at some point these p
Arizona and

It doesn't make

ines that come through

to some extent the one that comes down through Oregon, are going to

reach a maximum capacity to serve the people of California.

At that

you're going

to have to expand, build another pipeline, or whatever, which is going to cost the ratepayers.

It seems to me that if we do this, we're bringing in another supply of gas which
other than this fixed cost, is outside the normal ratepaying consumer and would

us additional years before which we would have to build this additional supply and
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therefore, raise the rates to our consumers.

So you have on one side, you're postponing

that cost to the future further away, you may be increasing, as we're talking about now,
some fixed costs to consumers today, but there's some, maybe some payoff or tradeoff,
which I don't understand, but it seems to me it just provides a source of gas which
doesn't impinge upon the other ratepayers except in this area of fixed costs, but it will
delay the need to build another system.
MR. SATRAP:

Can you comment on that?

I'll attempt to do that, Senator.

PG&E and Southern California Gas

Company recently submitted to the Public Utilities Commission various work papers on that
specific issue.

PG&E's document, The Analysis of Facility Requirements and Cost of Service

to Serve the Enhanced Oil Recovery and Enhanced Oil Recovery Cogeneration Market, completed
by PG&E in it's engineering department, look at various scenarios of service:
normal winter; summer; and other presumptions.

Cold winter;

And contrary to Mr. Carter's comment, PG&E

can serve the entire enhanced oil recovery market with no facility expansion through the
year 2000 under certain conditions.

Taking a more conservative approach and attempting to

determine what market could be served under conditions that were prescribed that only
occur once in every 35 years--cold winter--PG&E in it's portion of its market share in
the enhanced oil recovery could serve through 1996 without any facility expansion, so
that if we look at the supplies, and I think everyone agrees that the supplies are available to serve this market, if you look at the facilities that are required, and I don't
think that this is dissimilar to SoCalGas either in that we have shared our facility
capabilities under.the Commission's order, we both, as previously mentioned, can serve that
market through the year 2000.
We are able to move around 900,000,000 cubic feet a day.

The market expectations

that we hear that exceed 1 billion a day take various market consideration into account
and I think you have to discount some of those larger
or California fired gas.

loads based on host fired crude

But the market to be served to bring gas from outside of

California, both Pacific Gas and Electric Company and SoCalGas, are able through existing
facilities to serve through the year 2000.

Now if we take the scenarios of cold winter

and the need for some expansion of our facilities, I think from an economic consideration
it is easier and less costly to incrementally or add on to a system than it is to build a
whole system and go from zero deliverability to 600 deliverability overnight.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But the size of the pipeline at Arizona in only so big.

That's

where you get your gas, right?
MR. SATRAP:

We receive our gas in the state fromthetwo pipelines in the Topoc area

at the Arizona border and Canada and both systems have great capability of storing gas,
so that although you may see either any of the pipelines having capacity constraint during
the winter, it's the summer months when the utilities bring gas to California and hold
that gas for peak deliverability

during the winter.

Last week when we were hit with a

cold winter snap we were drawing more than 1 billion cubic feet a day out of the ground
that we brought in during the summer, so that is not a constraint.
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MR. JOHN:

What he's saying is you've got to combine your storage operations with

your pipeline capability.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But at the year 2000 you're going to have to expand that system.

You're going to have to build a bigger pipeline to bring the gas in so you can do all
these wonderful things that you're doing with it.

All I'm saying is that if you defer

that, that's a cost that the ratepayers don't have to bear because this pipeline, or one
of the two pipelines, is going to be providing those customers with gas outside the system
and so you have a greater flexibility for existing systems to serve into the year 2000 and
beyond.
MR. SATRAP:

Senator, if we separate the interstate pipelines, they are able to serve

that gas we perceive beyond the year 2000.

If you look within California, we are able to

serve with nominal costs after the year 1996 all the load thatis projected, but more
importantly, if the interstate pipelines did come in to serve that load between now and
1995 before any facility expansion is needed, the California ratepayers would not benefit
from the serving of that market because the two utilities would not have the contribution
margin or the money collected to cover the fixed costs, so it's inverse.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

That I understand.

That's a short-run, immediate problem.

I was

to get at the long-term cost of new facilities being paid for by the ratepayers and
deferring that and somewhere along there's one way to relate that and maybe the PUC knows
how to do that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
heard so far.

I have two or three things that are bothering me about what I've

On one hand policy has to be made as to whether or not we need more oil,

according to the Energy Commission.

Kern River says right now we have no intention of

serving any other customers other than the EOR, but there's no guarantee that they won't
take somebody else off the line.

Southern Cal and PG&E have a concern that ratepayers

may be affected by the gas that they're now selling to the San Joaquin Valley in terms of
bottom line dollars, and the possibility that in the future even more large customers may
come off the line.
And then I, quite frankly, look at the history of PG&E and Southern Cal Gas--not
really cooperating well--to serve the EOR in the San Joaquin Valley, and now you're concerned because the EOR decided they'll bring in their own.

And so I have these mixed

questions in my mind and I don't really know, I don't know how to answer them for myself.
You haven't been cooperative, now you will be cooperative because they've figured out
another way of doing it.
The question is do we in fact need more oil and then further, what's going to prevent
that line from taking off many more of your customers, the large users, and how does that
affect the ratepayers?
MR. JOHN:

So anybody want to touch that?

I'd like to make one point, Senator.

for an interstate pipeline.

You said the EORs have a preference

I don't think that's been proven yet.

posals by some pipeline companies for an interstate pipeline.
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We have various pro-

I don't think the EOR pro-

ducers have said yet formally which way they want to go.

We do know for a fact, however,

that Texaco has signed an agreement with Southern California Gas Company for transportion
to the EOR market.

We know that Shell has signed an agreement with Southern California

Gas Company for transportation and exchange of gas within California.
those are the only contracts of that nature that have been signed.

To my knowledge,

I think what those

produc2rs, however, are waiting for are some additional signals from the Commission, and
l'm sure Commissioner Vial will expand on this, some additional signals from the Commission that the transportation proposal that it proposed on October 17 will come to
fruition.
As far as cooperation between PG&E and SoCal, there have been differences of opinion
but I think it relates to the same reasons as we talked about earlier.

We're both trying

to protect our ratepayers' interests to the best, as best as possible.

Ultimately, the

PUC may have to make the decision as to how to do that, but I think that's also in the
Commission's crystal ball, let us say, that they want their transportation decision and a
resolution of the interutility dispute to take place at the same time and I think that
will happen.

I think then, and only then will we really know where the EOR producers are

coming from.
Sure, they've expressed concerns about the proposed order.

Any good businessman will

because he wants the best deal he can get, but let's see what the game in town is or
whether they're going to play the game or not.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay.

Mr. Gerlach, you didn't have an opportunity to say any-

thing,

Do you have anything to add that hasn't already been said by those sitting at the

table?

[Laughter.)

MR. WALTER GERLACH:
what's been said.

Senator, I'm not clairvoyant.

[Laughs.}

I really don't know

I do have a few comments if I could make them.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

All right.

We've had an explanation of what EOR is, and we've

had an explanation of the Kern River and Mohave as to what they are planning, what they
would like to do.
cussants.

You've heard since,you've been sitting here comments from the dis-

I'll give you a couple of minutes.

MR. GERLACH:
the committee.

All right.

I have some prepared comments here that I will submit to

What I would like to do, stepping away from these if I could, is just

give you some comments that come from the very basis of our corporation.

You have to under-

stand that this whole thing was started in 1984 by our company and one of the oil companies, so the rest of the people have come in since that point.
What I'd like to do is go back to that January 1984, where Producer's Gas Company,
the company that I'm out of as part of ElDorado, met with a very, very willing market.
One that in fact appeared to be crying out for help.

The market was industrial and it

consumed heavy oil for fuel due to the fact that natural gas was priced at $4.80-plus
per million btu, and crude oil was priced in the high-to-mid-$3 per million btu range
and no help was in sight.
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California was not like the other 48 contiguous states in that it did not have an
interstate option to transport gas to industrial customers.
the

Undaunted, we approached both

or California gas transmission and distribution utilities with a proposal to pro-

vide the required service,

to determine if in fact they would

excess

gas that we had already available in Oklahoma to these industrial customers to replace the
oil currently consumed.

We were told in no uncertain terms where to go and to take

horse we rode in on with us.

Thus, the statement that has

been heard around the gas

for years was restated, "You can't get gas into California."
The key word here is "can't."
a

Senator, in our vocabulary that's a stimulant and not

PGC, my company, set about finding a way to satisfy this unserved natural

gas market need under the criteria set by the EOR market itself and they are:
gas supply; long-term, what I'm calling long-term would be a 1
competitively priced with crude oil.

The utility service available to the

EOR market did not satisfy any of these criteria and as a consequence the EOR market continues for the most part to burn crude oil.
As

as the 1984 California Gas Report, a report compiled by the utilities,

not by us, both of the major gas utilities indicated that they were not or could not serve
the EOR market as outlined in the criteria previously mentioned.

They reflected major

curtailments in the EOR or higher priority users in the early 1990s.

Both of these gas

utilities are structured to serve the high priority residential, commercial, and small
industrial markets.

The larger volume loads are extra and must be heavily curtailed over

ime due to the competitive objectives of the firms' service.
this
do

The EOR market falls in

volume industrial category or possibly beyond because of its uniqueness.

We

believe that the distribution utilities can offer the level of service required

by the EOR market and not jeopardize their current priority customers.
PGC determined that the way to solve this situation was via an interstate pipeline
to transport EOR market-owned gas, which in turn does not have any

fuel
objectives.
cant do that."

1-vrt.en our project, quote, "leaked out," the response was, "You

Our favorite word, "can't."

The response then went to, "Over our dead

," followed by a panic which stated, "The interstates are coming, the interstates are

"
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. GERLACH:

This is what we're picking up in the trade.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
. GERLACH:

GERLACH:

From whom?

Various and sundry people, Senator.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
~ffi.

Who's saying all this?

The PUC?

Not the PUC.

The utilities?
We're picking this up from various people.

I'm not

ient of all of these but I have heard these from people in the trade.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Let me just shorten this up a little bit.

your pipeline?
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What's unique about

MR. GERLACH:

What's unique?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Yes, you know?

We have other suggestions for pipelines.

Tell us

about your line.
MR. GERLACH:

Our line is a 42 inch pipeline that extends from the EOR market back to

Topoc, Arizona which is very similar to one of the other proposals.

Our's was designed

and in the can before their's was even talked about, but that's another story.

Outside of

that it's the level of service that we're able to provide that we feel doesn't make us
unique, there are other pipelines that could possibly do the same thing.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. GERLACH:

What's the capacity?

520,000,000 a day free flow up to a maximum of 1.2 billion with com-

pression.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. GERLACH:

All right, can you kind of sum up?

Well, what I'm trying to get to, Senator, is at any time of the pro-

posals that we have presented represented a threat and that, that I got with a guaranteed
type conversation that has been presented before we would like to get into.
threat to the existing utilities.
threat to the State of California.
rt~ade,

We are not a

We are not a threat to the CPUC, and we're not a
We feel quite truly that the presentation that we have

the format, and the pipeline that we're talking about would be beneficial in many,

many ways to the State of California and specifically, to the market that desires this
service.

I think these people have to be heard from because it's these people that are

in essence that small body of ratepayers that will be paying the bill for this service.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

I'd like to ask you gentlemen now to

leave and l want to call up ... [Laughs.] ... the next panelist, Gary Simon, the California
Representative of the El Paso Natural Gas Company, and Mr. Vial, why don't we have you
up here.

We've already announced that your plane was late.

I'm sure you were as upset

about that that we were.
MR. DONALD VIAL:
MR. GARY SIMON:

I had a little deregulation experience.

[Laughter.]

Mr. Chairman and members, my name is Gary Simon.

Representative for the El Paso Natural Gas Company.

l'm the California

I'm having distributed to you now a

copy of my prepared remarks which I'll summarize and touch on some of the point that
you've raised this morning.
First of all, let me give you the story on why El Paso's situation is unique.

El

Paso, one way or another, is involved in all the plans to bring gas to the EOR market.
Our two biggest cutomers are sitting over there at the table across from me right now,
PG&E and SoCalGas.

We are a part of the existing gas delivery system to the State of

California.
At its peak, to get back to Senator Keene's question, the system in California was
able to move two customers 6.6 billion cubic feet of gas per day.

This was back in the

late '70s, early 1980s, and all of that capacity was used and El Paso was proYiding
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4 billion cubic feet per day of capacity on its system, not only to California, but to
its other customers.

That system has slimmed down considerably.

The peak now or the

average delivery in California now is about 4.5 billion cubic feet per day.

That's the

2 billion cubic feet per day of excess that everybody's talking about, but it. was fully
utilitized just a few years ago.

It's excess now because the market has dropped off.

To the extent that excess system can be used, that's how you regain the benefit to the
ratepayers.
A parallel thing happens on the El Paso system.
4 billion a day.

Our system, I said, can deliver

It's now delivering less than three, so we have an interest in moving

a lot more gas to California.
gas used by California.

We now supply just a little bit less than half of all the

We're a major supplier to both PG&E and SoCal.

Now El Paso supports prompt and effective service to the market in Kern County for
EOR production and we intend to participate in it in one way or another.

But ultimately,

how that market is served depends not on what El Paso wants, what the PUC wants, what
PG&E and SoCal wants, but what the customer needs.

The very basic fact is that those

customers in the San Joaquin Valley represent a large enough demand for gas in a small
confined geographic area that they can justify the construction of a new pipeline.

That

is not an opportunity open to many other industrial markets in the State of California
and one of the reasons you haven't seen a lot of other pipelines coming in here trying to
build their networks to serve individual markets is they're just too diffuse.

This one is

near the end of the interstate gas system already that ends at the Colorado River, and
it's very large and very compact.
The fact that you can bring a private line, as you put it, in here says that that's
the standard of service.
market must meet.

That's the bogie that everybody else who wants to serve that

The unanswered question we have to date is has what the PUC proposed

in it's draft order met that challenge?
yet whether it's good enough.

We don't know because the customers haven't said

We have a draft order put out by the PUC, comments on that

draft order which suggest, request other changes, but we don't have an answer yet as to
whether it's good enough.

It's probably going to be some time before we even know the

answer to that question.
My guess would be that nobody's going to commit the state service permanently and
nobody's going to commit to the interstate's permanently very early in the next year.
It's probably going to be the end of next year before those commitments are made.
I'd like to point out one other thing that hasn't necessarily come across to you.
None of the interstate up here have a commitment from anybody to ship gas for them.
of us have any customers.

None

The only things that exist right now are what Fred John talked

about, that is there are agreements pending to move gas over the intrastate system for
Shell and Texaco, and parallel agreements with El Paso to move that gas
Texaco, I might add.

for Shell and

El Paso also has an agreement with a third EOR party to bring gas

in that doesn't currently have an agreement with SoCal and it's pending the outcome of
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the PUC decision.

So that system .. and pieces o.f it ar.e beginning t.o fall, into place, but

those components--the transportation on El Paso system--are consistent, either with a
new interstate line or the existing intrastate line.
El Paso prefers to see the EOR market served by transportation to the existing
California utilities and therefore we really support what the PUC is trying to do here.
I.Jhy do

~;.;re

do that?

We're part of the existing system.

It's very simple.

It's by that

route that the benefits, in our view, of additional gas use in California are going to be
most widely shared.

However, if an interstate pipeline is necessary to meet the custo-

mer requirements, then we believe that it should be one that to the maximum extent
utilizes the surplus capacity of the existing interstate system.

By that option the

benefits of added California gas use are still returned as cost savings to California
customers.

Why?

Because it increases the through-put on the lines that are already

serving you--El Paso's and Transwestern's--and those benefits flow back to the ratepayers
here.
To this end, El Paso is in partnership with H.N.G. Internorth and Pacific Lighting to
build the Mohave Pipeline if it's necessary.

I might also that the ElDorado Pipeline

that was just described to you also connects to the end of the El Paso system
Transwestern system.
state facilities.

It's nearly a clone.

and the

And so it would utilize those existing inter-

The Kern River gas transmission proposal does not.

It's an all new

line.
Now not only has El Paso already signed agreements to move gas for EOR producers,
we have also filed to do what we call "debottlenecking" our system to increase its
capacity

to deliver gas.

lines move to California.

You have raised questions about how much can the existing
There really isn't a whole lot of problem

Paso's main line to the Colorado River where it's facilities end.

moving gas on El

There is a problem

getting gas into it's main line, it's coming in through the connections from systems
outside.

So we have filed an application to increase our capacity to accept third party

gas by 400,000,000 cubic feet per day.

You remember the market is about 1.2 billion.

The 400,000,000 up-rate is going to cost us about $12 million.
of service, that's a very low number.

It will be very easy to expand the system.

Now another question has been raised.
the Rocky Mountains into your system?

In terms of our total cost

Well, how do you get more gas from Canada and

In this application we've also indicated how that

could be done if shippers want to do it.

That particular option would increase our

capability to deliver by 600,000,000 cubic feet per day, the full capacity of Mohave and
El Dorado.

That costs $63 million.

SENATOR KEENE:

Question.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:
amounts.

Senator.

Capacity is

~ne

issue and the ability to deliver the required

Another issue I suppose is that of control and who controls the capacity and

wilnt th<• cost of that control

is to th<:> consumC'r.
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T don't nH'<ln to rt'opctl old wounds, hut

rather to refresh my recollection

the

Commission to control transmission costs to
consumer.

What is that

the California Public Utilities
customers and the ultimate customers, the

and i f it isn

to protect the consumer, wouldn't

competition in the transmission be desirable?

you have the

duce that capacity, wouldn't the consumer be

to prothat you would

then have to contend with in
MR. SIMON:

It's a close

where

greater benefit lies, Senator.

institutionally, is on both sides of the fence.

El Paso,

It would love to see the existing system,

including that within the state, used to the maximum extent under the supervision of the
PUC

but it also recognizes that the customer may be

here and he may not accept

that in which case Mohave, or an alternative, may be what s eventually built.

And in that

case you have lost potentially some control, but it may not be, as Commissioner Gandara
has raised, bad.

It may be that a redistribution of where burdens fall now may result in

a more fair system.

This is the argument that s

raised in favor of deregulation

and greater competition in
I don't know how good the

are that

already a tremendous amount of

and airlines, but there is

and util

ity competition going on

within the country and it seems to be
SENATOR KEENE:

Well, but you have a virtual

over the transmission of natural

gas into California as far as the EOR consumers are concerned.
MR. SIMON:

Well, no, we don't have a

because currently we share that

market \vith Transwestern, Pacific Gas Transmission, and other intrastate and offshore producers.

But let me

go

sion in its attempt to
p

that.

the Federal

the natural gas

ines like El Paso simply become railroads.

has created a structure whereby
We don't own the goods.

anybody who comes up and meets the conditions of the tariff.
transoort.
that

Regulatory Commis-

We move them for

It's called open access

El Paso, in recent letter to Commissioner Vial and its customers, has committed

July 1, 1986, once we've negotiated a number of arrangements to just make sure we

know where we are with our
words

we're

customers, will carry gas for anybody.
control over who's gas

a

So in other

on the system and we're just pub-

As long as you pony up with the gas at one of our inlet facilities,

we 11 carry it for a flat rate.
SENATOR KEENE:

MR. SIMON:

But who's to say that the

Well, because other

the FERC has said that the
called

is

you

allocated costs, and those

without competition in the

similar services and because
go beyond what's

can
now are

to be

low for El Paso.

It's 19 cents per million btu to move gas 2,000 miles from Texas to California.
SENATOR KEENE:

Would the same be true then for other interstate pipelines seeking

to get into competition in this business?

MR. SIMON:

Yes.

Other pipelines will probably follow suit but the problem is you're

in a transition period now and the crystal ball is a little murky.

You can't tell exactly

who will be choosing to go that open access route and when, but our guess would be that
most of the industry will go that route eventually.
SENATOR KEENE:

Then if those people choose to make that investment and that invest-

ment doesn't create an additional burden on the consumer, why shouldn't they be allowed
to do so?
MR. SIMON:

You mean the additional investment of a Mohave-type pipeline?

SENATOR KEENE:
MR. SIMON:

Yes.

I think you hit the nail on the head.

you can prevent them from doing it legally.

I don't know that there's any way

The way that you prevent them from doing it is

offering them competing service which is as good as or better from the existing utilities.
That's what the whole issue is about, is whether or not you can match what you call a
private pipeline can do with the existing system.

The benefit of going with the existing

system is then you're making some additional money off of it that spreads the fixed costs
farther or reduces the rates, depending on how you want to look at this.

But that's the

issue that I think you've confronted squarely and our point is the customer is going to
know it for probably several months.
SENATOR KEENE:

Okay.

economics of all of that.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I'll stop asking questions.

I'm still trying to sort out the

Thank you.
This may be a good point to introduce Don Vial, President of the

PUC, who while he did not hear all that took place before, probably can guess.

[Laughs.]

And so, welcome.
MR. DON VIAL:

Thank you.

I do apologize for being late.

I have picked up enough

since I've been here to realize that we probably have heard it all before.
that's what we're wrestling with in the Public Utilities Commission.

In fact,

There are vast

changes taking place, just in the structure of the gas industry on the production and distribution side.

The same kind of changes basically that are taking place in telecommunica-

tions and electricity.

And the policy control is not just in California because what is

involved here is national policy as well.

National policy, in fact, preempts in many ways

the policy options that we have at the state level.
So what we are looking at today is the changes that are coming down the track in this
industry and trying to deal with it in the most economic way, constructive way, so that
all of the ratepayers benefit from what is perceived to be out there--a lot of opportunities for the reduction of gas costs.

So our objective in the PUC has been to under-

stand fully what the national policy is of deregulation and the introduction of competition to carry out the deregulatory thrust, and what it means for us and the options that
we have in California in providing for the distribution of whatever benefits that may
exist in this evolving system.
One of the benefits of this evolving system thus far is an apparent abundance of
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gas and

reduction of prices at this

bubble is going to last.

, but we're not sure

how long this gas

The distributing utilities have responsibilities not only for

participating in the short-term spot market and

the benefits of this gas bubble

to all ratepayers in accordance with our

also have

to the long-term and the reliab

of

in the future.

responsibility of
Our policies have

to deal with those complex issues.
I think what is really apparent is whenever you move toward a deregulated environment with transportation involved in it on a common carrier basis, a contract carriage
basis, that there are certain groups of consumers that have more market power than others.
And it's clear from what's been said here today that the EOR market is in an extremely
powerful

ion and, in fact, if we don t

for

or provide for

sales gas to meet the needs of the EOR market, there will be
to be uneconomic bypass of the

distribution system.

we have all recognized
And there is consensus, I

believe, in California that the cheapest and most effective way to reach the EOR market is
through the existing distribution system.
at our policies to make
provided for.

Therefore, it challenges us in the PUC to look

sure that the most economic way of reaching that EOR market is

And that is why in a basic way that we have opted at this time for moving

toward a transportation proposal for California.

That's why we floated it for considera-

tion of all the parties.
Now we are looking at transportation in the context of
are many

commitments.

There

users outside of the EOR market that see the gas bubble and would like to
in the spot market and
basis.

spot market
part

If we were to

oy the benefits of transportation on a cost of
accede to that interest of going to short-term

, we could undermine the
in that spot market and br

So we're not

of the distributing utilities to

the benefits of that spot market to everybody.

interested in reaching those who want shot-term advantages of
in a spot market because those that want to participate on that basis, as

soon as the spot market turns sour
there to meet their needs.

want to

on the distribnt

utility to be

1

It seems to me that that s not quite fair unless you have some

in there for getting back into the system.
So what we have focused on in our

is the long-term transportation of gas

and in order to do that effectively we have to have some symmetry between the transportation tariff that we establish and the

sales rate design that exists, because

there is what you've been calling the contribution to the margin involved in this.
don't want to be encouraging decisions to be
nomic reasons and to leave the

to transportation tariffs for uneco-

sales tariff.

the long-term, that those who want to make a

We

Therefore, we have proposed that
commitment to securing their own

gas and, by the same token, relieving the utilities, the distributing utilities of the
commitment to serve that, to get that supply for them to a large measure, that they
should have the opportunity to do so so long as the contribution to the margin is the
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same as they would otherwise be making.
Se we have linked in our proposal the transportation tariff to the sales price for
the classification of the class involved, and the incremental cost of long-term supply to
the distributing utilities.

And we have floated that on the basis of whether it should be

a firm rate or rate that fluctuates on a six-month basis, and we have also raised the
question of whether we should include demand charges in that calculation, or whether or
not to include it.

That would involve the cost of transportation.

Now we did that because we realize in the long-run if we are going to provide for
the advantages of transportation to all, that we have to have it compatible with the rate
design for sales gas which, in turn, our transportation order then suggests that we need
to look at whether that rate design that we have today is an adequate rate design and a
fair rate design given the fact that there is a change in structure in this industry and
the greater reliance on market forces gives a lot more market power to those who have
greatest elasticity of demand, in economic terms, either in their ability to fuel switch
or in their ability to bring gas into California through a FERC-approved line that would
bypass our jurisdiction.

That possibility of a FERC-approved line in fact becomes the

maximum value of gas transportation for the EOR market for us and we recognize that fact
of life in our order and that is why we set a transportaion tariff of 3.5 cents per therm
for the EOR market, because we feel that that is the rate that would make it possible for
our California utilities to provide for transportation of customer-owned gas to the EOR
market competitively with an industrial line approved by FERC, and thereby avoid what we
believe would be uneconomic bypass of the present system.
So to sum up, and I've given you a prepared statement that goes into, I think, consistently into all the things that we took into consideration in arriving at our transportation proposal, we are in fact trying to adjust to the changes in national policy in
a way that will be most beneficial to California ratepayers taking into consideration the
market power of those who have the options to bring in the gas directly through a FERC
line, and running the risk of redistributingfixed costs on that basis for the rest of us,
or developing a system that would take advantage as much as possible of the supposed gas
glut as this time, provide for transportation on a long-term basis, and protect the margin
contribution of the network, and at the same time leave the door open for long-term
changes in rate design which may be indicated by the changes that are taking place.
Basically, that is what we have done in our proposal.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Let me ask a question.

companies' concern about a guaranteed supply?
MR. VIAL:

How does your proposal meet the oil

Their uninterrupted service?

Well, we have a section of the order on Page 33 and 34 that deals with

curtailment, diversion, and priority system and we point out that in the event of supply
shortages the transportation customer still receives its entire volume except during
emergency situation.

It's in the event of capacity shortages that firm transportation

customers are served to the same extent as retail customers of the same priority, and
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that I think iswhere the problem lies.

There is a clear advantage in that respect to an

interstate pipeline and we recognize that at the top of Page 34 of our order, if you want
to look at it.
So what we conclude at this point, and let me just read this to you because I think
it's important to recognize that we in the Commission want to provide as much predictability
and assurance to the EOR market as possible, but we want to do it in a way that's consistent with some of the principles that I was outlining before.

This is what we say, "We

recall that the priority system was originally intended to classify gas customers based
upon their ability to switch alternate fuels.

The EOR producers in the Kern River area

are constrained in their ability to switch from natural gas to crude oil to a far greater
degree than the electric generating steam plants of the utilities, for example.

Thus it

would see that adjustment of the priority system to correct this situation may be appropriate.

We'll also consider alternative means of insuring that transportaion customers

who are not easily able to switch from gas to alternative fuels are protected during curtailment situations.

One such proposal which is under consideration would permit low

priority customers who are transporting their own gas, such as EOR customers, to have a
r

to purchase gas during curtailment situations at the sales normally charged that

class of customers which is still receiving service under the curtailment."
In other words, during a capacity curtailment situation which resulted in the curtailment of load to priorities, P-7, P-6, P-5, and P-4, the EOR producers could continue
to receive gas service by purchasing gas to meet their needs at the regular P-3 price.
Now I know that isn't a complete answer to them and they'd like something better, but
we do say is that we recognize that there are some issues here and some problems and
we'

asked for comments on this specific issue, and in our final order we will be
that issue.

We are very serious about providing a realistic alternative to

a FERC line, not because we're just against a FERC line, but because it would be uneconomic

of the existing distribution system and we have an obligation as a PUC to do
possible to reach that market in a manner consistent with the interest of other
And that's exactly what we will do and we will do it to the extent necessary

under the

policies of the United States if we cannot turn those policies around

to make them more beneficial to California and this is where we think they can be improved.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

Yes, Senator Keene.

How can you be certain that a bypass of the existing facilities will

be uneconomic and how could it continue to be uneconomic if in being uneconomic it couldn't
compete with the existing distribution system?
MR. VIAL:

I'm not sure--you want to repeat it?

SENATOR KEENE:

Yes.

How can you be certain that bypassing the existing distribution

system would be uneconomical?

And if it were uneconomic, how can it continue to compete

with existing distribution systems?
MR. VIAL:

Well, if it were uneconomic bypass it would be promoted by our failure to
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recognize market forces and this is really what we're involved in.

When the policy

nationally is to defer to market forces and to implement a transportation system that
recognizes

the elasticities of demand in the real marketplace, if we don't recognize those

forces in our own rate design then there is going to be bypass because it's going to be
more economic to do it the other way.

So we are constrained.

All I'm really saying here

is we are constrained whether we like it or not to meet the alternatives that are available
and being made available by national policy.

To that extent it's uneconomic for us not to

do so because there'll be a more economic way.
If we have an artificial rate design that doesn't recognize market forces, they're
going to bypass it and we have to recongize market forces here whether we like it or not.
And I kick and scream all the way sometimes when I see the impact of

the potential for

shifting fixed costs in a manner adverse to a lot of customers as a result of these market
forces that are now given full play.

Because remember, whenever you rely increasingly on

market forces you are in fact deferring to those who have the most market power and those
in turn are going--the way they exercise that power or that elasticity of demand is going
to have a large impact on how the existing fixed costs of the distribution system are
going to be spread.

What's going on in telephone, what's going on in gas is a potential for

redistributing fixed costs away from the large users, from those who have more market power,
greater elasticity demand to those who have less.

That's the name of the game and we have

to deal with that fact.
SENATOR KEENE:

Okay.

I think I understand that concept.

I listened closely to what

you just said and I've been listening to this problem all morning and I can't hook the
two up.
MR. VIAL:

Well, I'm not sure.

The problem is that we have to make an adjustment in

existing pricing policies in order to accommodate an evolving market that has a lot of
bucks in it and everybody want to get into, including our own distributing utilities.

And

our own distributing utilities are urging us in the PUC to develop compatible policies
so that they can serve that market effectively, either by transportation or by sales gas.
PG&E's been interested more in sales gas and SoCal's been putting more of an emphasis on
transportation.

We have come down on the side of transportation because we believe that's

reality but we are also keeping the door open for sales gas alternatives that would be
compatible with the policy that's evolving.

We must adjust our pricing policies to deal

with the reality that there is now under national policy a group of potential customers
who have an awful lot of market power.

They have their own gas to bring in.

They can

bring it in under federal policies, or we are going to accommodate them to bring it in.
All we're trying to do is the least cost analysis to make sure that our utilities have an
opportunity to provide that service and that we do it in a way that maximizes as much as
possible a fair contributionto the margin to maintain the existing distribution system.
I keep going around the same answer.
SENATOR KEENE:

I'm not sure .•.

Because you would like to see the existing system be sufficiently
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competitive

that new systems will not come onto the scene.

MR. VIAL:

Yes.

And the reason is that if we appear to be resisting a FERC industrial

line coming into California, it's because we know that that's the beginning of the segmentation of demand in the industry in a way that inevitably means as the forces play out
that we must redistribute increasingly some of the fixed costs of the system to those
with less economic market power.

And we have a resistance toward doing that because it

decreases the options of the Commission in dealing with the social policy that also frequently accompanies regulation of a utility, of a service that is important to all of us.
SENATOR KEENE:

So whether the California utilities as a segment along the way, it

give the PUC an ability to regulate for what's regarded as beneficial social purposes
from your standpoint, but you don't have the opportunity to do so with the FERC pipelines?
MR. VIAL:

Well, it would reduce our ability to be in control of rate design and to

deal with the margins that are necessary to maintain a

distributio~

system are diminished

to the extent that the demand is segmented and we have less control over a lot of the
margin that would otherwise go to support the network.

Remember that when you talk about

transportation to the EOR market that while a number of the pipelines says they're only
and exclusively interested in the EOR market, it doesn't take much economic imagination
to understand that there isn't a heck of a lot of difference between a lot of the incremental customers in the EOR market and a lot of the big industrial users who are chafing
at the bit to get at cost-based transportation.

In fact, one of the largest criticism

of our order at the present time is by non-EOR market industrial users who feel that they
have been supporting the network for a long time and are not getting the advantage of the
transportation that is being made available to the incremental users in the EOR
market and they're pretty upset about it.
, in fact, are saying, "We want cost-based transportation," and our response to
them is "We hear you loud and clear, but we have an existing rate design that is built on
value of gas, not on cost-based pricing, and that if we have to make some adjustments we
have to do this in a consistent fashion," and therefore, we've attached to this order a
dissertation of the issues that we think are important to confront in rate design
now that we are moving into transportation and must confront a lot of the aspects of the
sales gas tariff that may not be compatible with the changes that are taking place in the
environment.
SENATOR KEENE:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

All right, thank you very much.

In closing, before the lunch

break, I'd like to get somebody back up here from the oil companies because I have two
quick questions that could take about two minutes if you give me a direct answer ...
[Laugher.] ... and could take two hours if you didn't.
MR. REISNER:

Mr. Chairman, Don Reisner again.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. REISNER:

Fine.

I have another witness here who can answer some of the questions that
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have been raised, possibly the question you were thinking of.

Mr. Randy McCrae from

Shell.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
to break for lunch.
duce the oil now?

Well, we're going to have my two questions and then we're going

Okay?

We heard from the Energy Commission a concept

Why do we need more oil?

MR. RANDY McCRAE:

of why pro-

Can you give me a quick answer?

I think even though my expertise is in the area of natural gas I

can comment briefly on that.

My name for the record is Randy McCrae, I'm a staff natural

gas representative with Shell Oil Company in Houston.
Certainly Mr. Gandara indicated that there was some benefit to the national security
and a reduction of reliance on imports by the increased production of oil here in the
United States, and even though there are broad policy implications for the nation in his
question, I think there is certainly a benefit to the nation by whatever incremental
production of oil that can be achieved.
Certainly, the other answer to this question I believe, or your question, is that
there's certainly a benefit to California in producing that oil as it contributes to the
national energy security in creating jobs and tax base and everything else that it brings
to the state.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

You haven't convinced me.

Now I don't know whether somebody

else has a different answer, but the other question is one is very significant in terms
of air pollution.

The Kern County Air Pollution Control District has asked you to cut

your NOx emissions by 50 percent.
MR. McCRAE:

Are you prepared to do that?

As far as Shell is concerned,

all the guidelines that are on us.

Se~ator,

we're continuing and we have met

We are burning right now, Shell is burning a large

amount of gas at all facilities where we have connections and where it is economically
available we are burning gas right now to contribute to that effort and to reduce those
emissions.

I cannot speak for any of the other companies but Shell has certainly made a

large effort to do that and meet those requirements.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Any other oil company want to give me a quick answer?

Are you

prepared to reduce your NOx emissions by 50 percent?
MR. REICHARDT:
to that.

Terry Reichardt with Chevron.

I can't give you a yes or a no answer

I believe that our emissions are consistent with the current requirements.

believe we're in conformance.

I

I would like to state that in terms of whatever amount of

heavy oil it is economic to produce, there will be less emissions if it's done with the
natural gas rather than with crude oil.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

What if part of the arrangement was that if you had this pipe-

line, you'd have to cut emissions from your other operations?
MR. REICHARDT:

From our other operations other than heavy oil?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Yes.

You know, in the area.

you've got to cut NOx 50 percent.
MR. REICHARDT:

What would be the answer?

You've got to, you know, they say

They don't tell you which plant has to do that.

We would like to convert to natural gas.
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If we had a pipeline, we'd

like to convert our steam generators from crude oil to natural gas.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

MR. REICHARDT:

But you haven't indicated whether you would cut NOx 50 percent.

I don't know the answer to that.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

All

I just wondered if because of the order of presentations being

reversed--I still have some issues interested in where I would like to hear a rebuttal,
if possible, from some of the FERC pipeline people to Mr. Vial's testimony.
know whether they should be requested to submit papers, or what.

I

don't

I know we're out of

time for the presentation.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
it

Well, if we could get some quick answers, I wouldn't mind doing

now, or else they can present papers.
MR. CARTER:

I would suggest that the questions be specified and some written

responses be made, if that's possible.

It might be more efficient time wise and might

get you some better answers and then if you have further questions, we could convene again.
SENATOR KEENE:

Okay, because I was listening to your position within the context of

not having President Vial, then I heard him and I'm kind of interested in hearing what
your response is to that.

MR. CARTER:

· And I would love to give you that but my concern is that the

time would not be efficiently utilized.

You've got another hearing and a lunch break.

I think we're going to run into a real time problem.
SENATOR KEENE:

Maybe some written submissions would be useful.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

We will break until two o'clock.

[Break.]
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
nia

Very good.

Good timing.

Mr. Imbrecht, Chairman of the Califor-

Commission, and Mr. Pugh, Chairman of Management, California/Oregon Trans-

mission Project.

Why don't you join

us.

The discussants on this side, Don Vial, Com-

missioner of Public Utilities, Douglas Oglesby, Attorney for PG&E, and I guess we have no
representative from SoCal Edison at this point.
This afternoon our focus shift to electricity.

California's

electricity future

seems to be moving us away from being electricity producers to becoming energy consumers,
power from our neighboring states.

Evidence for this is the proposal

before us for discussion today.
A consortium of private and public utilities is planning to build another major
transn1ission line to the Northwestern United States in order to enable more imports from
this region and greater competition among electricity producers.

But the history of power

from the Northwest suggests to me that this new transmission may be a direct line to
extortion.

[Laughs.)

in the last six years.

Power from the Northwest has escalated in price about 800 percent
Another line will make us even more captive to this unpredictable

market.
Our speakers today are directly involved in planning this new line.
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I ask them to

tell us of the guarantees we can get that power from this line will be reasonably priced,
and advise us of what we need to do to protect ratepayers in California from the whimsy
of our northern neighbors.
Energy Commission Chairman Imbrecht will open our discussion with a status report.
I also invite our panel of discussants to the front of the room, which I've already done,
to comment and to raise questions.
~ffi.

CHARLES IMBRECHT:

With that, Mr. Imbrecht.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members.

Again, I appreciate the

opportunity to be with you this afternoon.
I think that probably it would be useful if we went directly to one of the premises
behind the statement that was included in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, which really
lies at the heart of the confusion, if you will, about the efficacy of the third Northwest
intertie on the AC side, as well the upgrades to the DC line.

Because while I appreciate

on the surface how you might reach the conclusion that you suggested, I'd like to suggest
to you instead that actually it is the current situation that in fact puts California in
a sellers marketplace, if you will, from the perspective of the Northwest, and it is the
current situation that has made it possible for the Bonneville Power Administration and
the other utilities in the Pacific Northwest to increase rates to California over the last
few years.
The reason for that is as a practical matter the best way to try to imagine this is
we have an inadequate extension cord that exists between California and the Pacific Northwest.

Today the current extension cords, the two AC Northwest intertie lines, which were

constructed in the early and mid-1960s, are filled to capacity virtually the entire year.
As a consequence, despite the fact that there is an abundant surplus of economy energy
available both from the states in the Pacific Northwest--1'11 get to the reasons for that
in a few moments--as well as from our neighbors in British Columbia and to a lesser extent in the Province of Alberta as well, that because of limited transmission capacity
there is no actual market competition for the prices of power that are sold to California,
because of the fact that there are more parties with power to sell, trying to squeeze onto
a line that has an inability to carry the totality of the surplus energy from the Pacific
Northwest.

That as a practical matter eliminates competition.

That has also as a practical matter made it possible for the Bonneville Power
Ad1ninistration to enunciate something we and the Public Utilities Commission have consistently opposed in both regulatory and judicial forums, and that is something known as
the intertie axis policy which seeks to further limits and allocate shares of existing
line between the parties in the Northwest, in essence market shares.

From our perspective,

almost a classic antitrust violation where we're talking about a free enterprise system,
allocate those market shares in terms of sales to California.

That has made it possible

further for the Bonneville Power Administration to in essence dictate a for-price, forsales to California by virtue of them enunciating a price and then allocating the
remaining shares on the line, there is obviuosly no incentive for other utilities in the
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Northwest to compete in the marketplace for sales to California.

The Bonneville enuncia-

ted price becomes the de facto regionwide price.
What we seek to do by virtue of construction of a third Northwest intertie on the AC
side

in conjunction with the DC upgrade that runs down from Nevada that has been announced

in a cooperative project between Southern California Edison and Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power, is several fold.
First and foremost is to expand the access of all utilities and in turn, therefore,
the ratepaying public of the state, the entirety of the ratepaying public, not just those
who participate because their servicing utilities have a current share of the highway, if
you will, that access to the energy markets in the Northwest and British Columbia.
Secondly, we anticipate that that will enhance rather than diminish the competition
for sales to the state.
Third, the physical changes in the system have been demonstrated in many technical
forums to substantially, if not dramatically, increase the realiability of the entire
Western transmission grid.

We here in California have our own loop, if you will, and that

is a rough oval of transmission capacity that runs from the northern portion of the state
doW11 to the southern portion of the state.

There are two other loops that exist west of

the Rockies, all of which are tied into our system and without getting into a complex
discussion like we did a week ago, suffice it to say that if there is a physical breakage
anywhere in the system, it can have profound impacts; not just in that same geographical
locale, but literally throughout the entire Western United State.
An incident that's in utility circles that's reflected upon most regularly is the
so-called Leap Year Blackout on February 29 of '84, where a break in the system at the
Oregon/California

border produced blackouts as far away I believe as Phoenix, Arizona

and Colorado and throughout the entire Western grid.
The upgrade of the DC line and the construction of a third AC line will appreciably
enhance the system reliability and that means the physical guarantee that ratepayers
throughout the Western United States will enjoy the certainty of supply that makes our
entire industrial manufacturing base, our style of life, not to mention impact upon our
low income communities palpable, or I should say reasonable within the current context.
In addition, we believe that the seasonal exchange opportunities because the Pacific
Northwest is a winter peaking electric system, that is they use the bulk of their energy,
the high peak periods, the days of the year when they need the most energy, that occurs
in the winter for them and for us it occurs during the summer, at least that's the case
for the vast preponderance of the population in California.

And so this enhancement of

t

our transmission capacity, in essence the extension cord between the two regions also
opens up the opportunity in a much greater way than has been the case in the past, for
seasonal exchanges between the two regions.
What that means is they can sell us their surplus during the summer, which is
basically hydroelectric generated surplus.

In wet years their dams are brimming to
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capacity and spill a tremendous amount of hydroelectric capacity over the spillways of
projects which were constructed with Federal dollars which we in California contributed to
as did the citizens of the Pacific Northwest.

Today that energy is literally wasted in

facilities where rivers have already been dammed and the environmental consequences have
been accepted or acclimated or in one fashion or another, and that energy literally pours
out to the sea despite the fact that it could instead be directed through turbines and sold
to California.
Now another I think very important benefit of this project, aside from the prospect
of producing literally a regional electrical system for the entire Pacific Coast with all
attendant system reliabilities, strategic considerations, as well as the prospect for substantial economic benefits for both regions, and that's obviously the crux of the problem
which I want to speak to last.
This also has a very positive impact within the utility community in our own state.
I think one of the things that's frequently overlooked generally when we discuss the
electric generation system is somehow a perspective that the investor-owned utilities of
California service all of our population.

Frankly, nothing could be further from the case.

When it comes to electricity only about 70 percent of the citizens in our state are
serviced by investor-owned utilities, and fully 30 percent of our people are serviced by
publicly-owned utilities, including the constituents, well many of the constituents which
each of you represent.

That's an aspect of our utility system that doesn't engender the

same degree of attention frequently, other than the case with respect to investor-owned
utility issues.
There has been, suffice it to say, historic disagreement between the public and
private utilities in the state over access to Pacific Northwest power and the attendant
benefits to the ratepayers of the state, to the system reliability issues, etc., and by
the historic agreement that was signed by virtually every utility in our state, both
public and private, in the Spring of this year, approved by Congress in August and signed
by the President shortly thereafter as a rider to the Department of Energy appropriation's
bill this year.

This historic agreement not only provides access to that 30 percent of

the state's population that has largely been deprived of access to the Northwest marketplace in the past through their servicing utilities, but it also, assuming we're able to
move forward to construction of the line, sets to rest historic and long-standing regulatory and judicial agreements between the public and private utility sectors in our
state.
There is a case known as the "Quad Seven" which has extended well over a decade
which deals with these issues, and if the project goes forward to completion as the terms
of the agreement on the allocation of shares the line, that litigation and that disagement will be set aside.
Finally, the obvious question is will this make sense from a cost effective standpoint to the people of this state?

Let me simply say in very clear terms that I don't
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believe there is a single party to the agreement, nor is there a single regulator who has
any responsibility or jurisdiction with respect to this who has not consistently been
saying to Pacific Northwest, "This line will not happen unless there is adequate assurance
with respect to the predictability of price and the assurance of supply over a period
sufficient to justify the economic investment in the line."
We think as a practical matter that we have accomplished the bulk of our responsibilities in California and the ball to a certain extent is in the court of the Pacific
Northwest and largely in the court of the Bonneville Power Administration.

Our utilities

have struck a historic agreement known as the Memorandum of Understanding.

Our utilities

are currently engaged in interconnection agreements that will decide where the actual
physical transmission connection points actually occur, and there are already bilateral
with respect to long-term and medium-term contracts over price and supply.
Nonetheless, there remains the question of how the Bonneville Power Administration will
effectively utilize its near dominant position, or I should say dominant position in the
Northwest in terms of rate setting structure.
We've tried to say to them very clearly, both in the electricity report which was the
point of some discussion at the last hearing, and obviously there are many other aspects
besides cogeneration in that report.
in

We've said to them in that forum, we said to them

and judicial proceedings, etc., that now is the time to fish or cut bait.

That we have gone the extra mile, that we have put our parties together in California in
a way that's unprecedented, and if you don't come to terms on the price/ supply issues in
next six months, or thereabouts, as a practical matter what you will force California
is to build other generation capacity.

For example, the cogeneration projects that

we discussed at the last meeting, along with a wide range of projects that we've also
mentioned to you are currently in the planning horizon, much of which is well beyond the
stage and has signed contracts and is at the point where it's either about to
file

for certification for construction, or we'll go through other regulatory pro-

cesses beyond the Energy Commission or the PUC's jurisdiction.

That that capacity will be

built and as a consequence the marketplace here in Caifornia will be lost to you, not just
the new marketplace, that is the potential, but also in a very real sense much of the
exist

marketplace because of the types of new energy generation which we are adding to

our own system within our state.
Finally, where does this leave us?

The ball is to some extent in their court.

There

have been a number of ongoing discussions involving the highest level of our regulatory and
our utility community, both private and public.

More of those meetingsare frankly

scheduled in the next few weeks, and I would have to put it to you in this context--we
are cautiously optimistic that they are going to understand the realities.

And assuming

they do, then in fact this represents one of the great energy opportunities for the
of our state, as well as for the people of the Pacific Northwest.

It literally is

a situation from an economic standpoint which clearly can pencil out to be a win, win for
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both regions.
What we've said to the people in the Pacific Northwest and the great diffusion they
have there, and if you think we have a lot of utility interests in California, let me
invite you to join me on a trip to the Northwest and you'll find that the 90 to 100
interests that produced "WHOOPS" (Washington Public Power Supply System--WPPSS) are still
very much on the scene today; that, in fact, they have an opportunity to serve their own
citJzuns 1ikl~ we, that wu are looking for a deal that roughly
the two regions.

divides the benefits between

We're confident that that can be the case.

And finally, I'd just like to tie this afternoon's conversation into this morning's
discussion because I think it is important to realize that each of these energy sectors
do not operate in a vacuum from one another.

They are very much related.

And in fact

what has occurred on the natural gas side, the deregulation of domestic natural gas, the
reduced prices, etc., acts as a practical matter as an economic cap on what, on the price
that Pacific Northwest can sell electricity to California for.

Obviously, our utilities

that have generation capacity are not going to buy surplus from the Northwest if they can
generate it within their own systems, even with natural gas for example, at a lower cost.
It is that threshold Northwest has to compete with.

I think there are enough players in

the Northwest that understand that and I also believe that there is enough diversity
within the utility systemsin California.

Rate differences between our private and public

utilities who has generation capacity, who does not, who has access to the Northwest, who
does not, who has peak or baseload generation capacity, etc., that with a line in place
there will be ample opportunities for a broad range of our utility interests to demonstrate economic justification.
I applaud and I might say also very much accept, and it's probably not the right
term--I not only accept, but expect, as the PUC has rightfully enunciated their responsibility to ensure that our investor-owned utilities strike a deal that's prudent for the
interest of their ratepayers, and we're trying to do that with them with the investorowned utilities and also trying to assist our publicly-owned utilties in that same regard.
I'd be happy to give you any genral background about the role of the Administration or the
Governor in this entire discussion.

It has been ongoing for slightly in excess of two

years presently.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
line.

Let me just say, Mr. Imbrecht, I'm concerned about the bottom

I'm concerned about the prospect of increased competition lowering the sales rate

by Bonneville to California.

I'm also concerned about long-term contracts and so in

light of those two concerns and what came out of our last hearing in which we're now
facing a surplus of electricity in California, few new power projects are being planned
because of sufficient resources to meet the in-state demands.

What are really the

opportunities [or us to sell surplus electricity produced in California to tl1e Northwest
as part of this exchange in this regional concept?
MR. IMBRECHT:

I don't really see it.

Well, the opportunities have to do with the fact that they are a
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hydroelectric dominant system and as we well know, hydro power varies tremendously from
year to year depending upon level of rainfall.

And the last year actually their hydro

system has been deplenished in a very large sense.

They have actually had to rely upon

British Columbia to supply some of the imported power purchase needs of utilities in
California.

When you talk about seasonal changes we're talking about California being

able to use some of its baseload capacity in the winter when it doesn't need that generation capacity to sell to the Northwest and back their system up.

It provides in essence a

guarantee for them just as they can provide a guarantee to us during the summer months
because that's when the Spring runoff occurs, when their dams are filled, and when they're
in a position to sell us hydroelectric power almost irrespective of what the level of rainfall might be.
ter~s

Now obviously, that's not the case if it's a drought-type year, but in

of average conditions that is the situation.
At issue for them--if they have a very wet year, that means they can sell surplus to

us for much longer periods.

If they have a medium year, that cuts off earlier in the

Spring.
In terms of what it means for our ratepayers in terms of price and whether that makes
sense versus building genration capacity within our own states, let's put this in a little
bit of perspective.
Cl~IRMAN

ROSENTHAL:

Yes, but it was indicated at the last hearing that we don't need

any more facilities, we don't any more electricity in California.
MR. IMBRECHT:

No, what we said the last time--no, that's not quite true.

said at the last hearing is we need 6,350 megawatts

What we

of additional capacity in the next

period, and we have identified on the drawing boards substantially more than that,
both in terms of capacity and energy, projects that are under contemplation for construction.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. IMBRECHT:

Right.

The question is should we allow a very expensive project to be built

in California if we can meet those energy needs by long-term purchases of inexpensive
energy from neighboring regions.

And if you want to look at it from the perspective of

environmental consequences, don't we really have some obligation to look at regional
interests as well?

Do we build in California to generate when there is already developed

capacity right at our border?
Interestingly, when the Northwest intertie was built, three lines were brought down
to the Oregon/California border.
cisco region.

Only two were constructed from there into the San Fran-

We're really just talking about completing the system, if you will, that

was begun in the 1960s.

I guess the point I want to make to is no deal is going to work

unless they can meet what in essence is the marginal costs of gas generation, which I
guarantee you is lees than the cost of building new generation and it's certainly in the
neighborhood of 60 to 70 percent maximum cost of new generation, that's assuming the most
cost effective new projects only being approved.
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Under almost any scenario if the deal is going to work you're talking about sales to
California of energy that is substantially less expensive than anything that we can bring
on-line in California, with the possible exception of geothermal.
really comes down to.

And that's what it

Do we want to give our ratepayers the benefit of what is roughly

the equivalent of two nuclear plants in terms of generation over a 15 to 20-year period?
In terms of rate savings I think that the answer if you look at it from an economic standpoint is obvious, assuming, and that's the one assumption that's left, that Bonneville
Power Administration understands and recognizes these realities and comes to terms

with

them in their rate structure.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

Senator Keene.

I understand the carrot part of the equation that says its a win/win

for both sides if it gets put together.

You also had a stick part that we had some

leverage with them and what kind of leverage is it to say that if you don't enter into a
partnership or a contract arrangement with us on this, why we're going to go ahead and
build domestically.
MR. IMBRECHT:

Is that real leverage?
Yes, indeed, it is real leverage because today the Pacific Northwest,

and one of the reasons that there is some caution about going forward is because they're
a region that has suffered very immense economic problems--the timber industry

and you're

certainly familiar with the problems that they've experienced.
SENATOR KEENE:
something.

... bring my district into this.

You must be a former legislator or

[Laughs.]

MR. IMBRECHT:

I always try to move this around to self-interest.

Their timber

industry has suffered as had Northern California in a very similar fashion because of
interestingly, Canadian imports I think is a large part of that.

Their aluminum indus-

try, their mining industry, etc., is also in a very difficult position.

Of the five

major industries up there, basically the aerospace industry appears to be the only one
currently that is in a reasonably healthy situation.

And because of the critical role we

play in terms of the total economics--and again I'm going off in some detail and stop me
when you like--but the Bonneville Power Administration is a TVA or Tennessee Valley
Authority-type

institution.

Federal tax dollars.

The Columbia River system projects were constructed with

They have had an outstanding debt to the Federal treasury.

frankly know how long it's going to go but certainly a very long period of time.

I don't
They

went through a long period where they did not repay their debt to the Federal treasury.
There's enormous pressure on them to do that.

The reason you've seen some fluctuation in

the rates to California is largely a perspective of them trying to enhance their ability
to repay that debt up to the maximum extent possible.
I think all parties feel thatthey've
this in a little perspective.

~gely

reached the ceiling.

I just want to put

Though the prices have gone up dramatically, they are still

below 30 mills for kilowatt hour and if you can find a utility in California
generate power for that, I'd like to see it.
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that can

The fact of the matter is, there is none,

so even with the increases it still is less expensive current generation.

What we're

to you is we believe a deal can be put together, and I think frankly most of the
parties in the Northwest do that recognizes the economic realities.

Certainly many of the

investor-owned utilities have already said that clearly.
What we come down to in terms of stick, if you will, is that the types of additions
we've made to our system that impact·new cogenerators also impact sales from the Northwest,
baseload generation.

As a consequence, it's not just future sales but also existing

market that is jeopardized.

We're doing our best to make that case in a technical and in

an economic discussion environment in a regulatory body.

The semantics are not dissimilar

from those which occur in front of the Public Utilities Commissionrurl I think we made that
case as strongly as we can from an intellectual and technical standpoint, and it's really
a question

of them to chew on it for the time being.

to both public and private discussions.

We're trying to move this forward

I'm confident that there are enough political

interests in the Northwest as well as understand these realities thatin fact we're going
to produce a deal.
And I would just note for you that this is one of those strange issues.

When I first

arrived in my current position, one of the things I was struck by was the amount of disagreement within the utility and energy community within our own state.

Here's an issue

where we have largely put together those interests and you have people that have been
historical enemies all marching in the same direction and all understanding the clear
benefits to their respective ratepayers.
offer a judgment in advance
put this

I think it would be a pity and frankly, I'll

a slippage of our public responsibility if we're not able

The only thing that is going to hold it up, quite frankly, is the
that I made reference to that seems to produce intransigence in the Northwest

same

and other issues, and that is they
smaller region.
numbers.

have

so many more parties than we've got in a much

You figure basically in California we've got 40 utilities in round

They've got 90-plus and a population in the four states that is less than half

of our total state population.

That's the biggest problem.

When you sit down with these

it's a little bit like negotiating the State Assembly.
SENATOR KEENE:

They haven't yet discovered the advantages of concentration of

ical power, have they?

MR. IMBRECHT:

That's right.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Yes, Senator Russell.

To what extent is the fact that this energy could displace, what

14, 18 megawatts of ...

MR. IMBRECHT:

Sixteen hundred AC.

We're looking at roughly 1,600 megawatts and the

DC upgrade, which is a separate project, but frankly the two fit together from an operating standpoint.

Actually the system reliability with the AC/DC combination--I'm not

sure I want to use that phrase--is enhanced.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Okay, but to what extent are the environmental concerns really
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demonstrated in terms of reducing pollutants that would otherwise be produced by cogeneration, by other types?
MR. IMBRECHT:

As we discussed, as I think I made reference to at the last meeting, I

have yet to discover any energy generation technology that is environmentally benign.
They each have their negatives whether it be air quality or land intensiveness or aesthetics, or what have you.

There are factors with respect to all technologies that are

problems and I don't want to suggest to you that a transmission line doesn't have its
own set of problems, but I will also tell you that the project's that contemplated here,
Mr. Pugh, who's the President of the NCPA and also an

elected official, has really been

one of the key individuals in assisting us and actually taking the lead in putting this
whole matter together and will talk about the

specifi~of

the project.

Actually, I think

without prejudging the CEQA process, etc., contemplates the upgrade, the predominant portion of the project will contemplate the upgrade of an existing Western area power administration line which means minimal new rightaway acquisition, and all the other attendant
environmental issues ...
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. IMBRECHT:

I was thinking primarily of air pollution.

The major environmental groups in the state have endorsed this

project, I might add.

And another perspective in terms of enhancing the system reliability

is if we were to build a third AC line parallel to the existing two, the same natural
disaster takes the whole system out, or the same physical disaster of an airplane crash,
for example.

By moving the third line to a different physical location, we enhance the

reliability of the system and what does that mean to the people?
an intangible quality.

Well, that's not simply

We all take the granted the fact thatour lights stay on on a regu-

lar basis, and so forth, and we take for granted that our industrial base has energy on a
regular basis.

In many countries that's not the case and it's certainly something that

I've also learned in this position.

And there clearly is an economic benefit, as well

as price that ought to be attributed to that certainty of supply.

Because of how we're

overloading the system, I wouldn't say overloading the system, but we're certainly
loading the system currently up to its theoretical limits and by doing so we jeopardize
supply for everyone.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Can you or have you related this completion of all that you pro-

posed to reduce air pollution in any particular part of the state?
MR. IMBRECHT:

No, sir, we have not.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. IMBRECHT:

Could that be done at some time in the process?

I think it could be done.

LF :_ 's just put i t in round terms.

This

project alone would account for 25 to 30 percen• of the new capacity needs for the state
over the next 12-year period and whether that :)e cogeneration--we don't really know what
the system is going to be.

If, as we discuss'::i last week, we were to change our siting

policies back to the status quo of last Spring, virtually everything that would be built
in the next few years would be gas fired

generation.
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And I would just also put that

in the context of this morning's discussion where there was some discussion about concern
about the length of time that the gas bubble will exist.

That goes back to the point that

I was trying to make a week and-a-half ago about building into the system reliance upon
natural gas.

I think President Vial referenced some concern of their's about how long

that bubble's going to last and it affects the cogeneration issue very much.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
Southern California?
MR. IMBRECHT:

Is

most of the need

for this extra generating capacity in

The majority of it?
Well, I don't think it's easy to generalize and I wouldn't say that,

but baseload--there's more base needed in Southern California than there is in Northern
California large due to the addition of Diablo and Helms, but the difference in the
interest, Senator Russell, between the variety of our utility interests in the state are
A to Z.

I think Mr. Pugh can probably also better talk about what it means to a

publicly-owned utility who has had neither access to firm or nonfirm surplus sales from
the Northwest, how they can economically justify the line simply on the basis of nonfirm,
much less firm.

It can be ••.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
next,

Well, what I'm getting at, Mr. Pugh, if you're going to come on

as Mr. Imbrecht said, this would take care of one-third of the

potential generating capacity needed in the future.
California, where would that one-third primarily be?
we have a pollution problem?

My concern, coming from Southern
Heavily in Southern California where

And if that is the case, I would assume then this addi-

tional electrical generating capacity would address in a favorable way the reduction of
pollution or the minimizing of pollution by that amount of capacity rather than building
new facilities, be they cogeneration or whatever?
MR. IMBRECHT:

I think that you've just given Mr. Pugh another issue to add to his

declaration for the--I don't think it'll be a negative declaration--but for his
EIR.

Mr. Pugh, in addition to being the President of MCPA, a former mayor and member of

MCPA and currently a member of their council, but is also the head of TANC, which is
the consortium of interests that has been formed as the transmission agency of Northern
California.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. IMBRECHT:

Mr. Pugh.

Maybe he can address some of those.

I'll be happy to answer any

other questions you may have.
MR. ARCHER PUGH:

Thank you, Mr. Imbrecht, Senators.

I appreciate the opportunity

to come talk to you on behalf of both the Transmission Agency of Northern California,
which I'm Chairman, and the California/Oregon Transmission Project, which I am Chairman
of the Management

Co~~ittee.

City of Redding.

I was formerly a mayor there and have in the past been the Chairman of

As Mr. Imbrecht has told you, I'm a councilman from the

the Northern California Power Agency and I'm currently the Chairman of the Transmission
Agency of Northern California; was President of MSR, which is another power agency of
Modesto, Santa Clara and Redding.
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A little of the background, I think that Mr. Imbrecht has expressed the fact that !:he
publics started this prog,::am some time ago in an attempt to gain access to the ,\;orthwes:
which we have never had. Most of the public power agencies in Northern California which
are involved, there were 15 agencies, were not in the process of generatin[
They were:
wholesale customers of either the Western Area Power Administration or Pacific Gas and
Electric.

Over the years there has been a tendency to attempt to become an independent

generator, an independent utility in having the availability of different resources and
different sources of power.

The transmission looked like a vehicle that that could be

used to attempt to do that and to create that situation.
In early 1984 we had put together with Western Power Administration a plan which
would allow us to develop this line and upgrade the Western lines to bring that power in.
In 1984 we also met with the private

utilitie~

in the process of trying to put together

an agreed program as per direction from Congress, to work together to develop a memorandum
on how we would participate in the line, what shares would go to the different member
agencies in the state, and how the line would be basically structured and the function.
So over a long period of time we met and discussed and negotiated postures within all of
the agencies in California to come up with a memorandum of understanding which
set

up

the methodology of developing this line and how it would be used and function.

One of the things that the Transmission Agency of Northern California did as a joint
powers agency when it formed was discuss very definitely what its function was to be, and
that function was to be only of developing the transmission line.

The diversity among

the members as to what needs they had were the types of energy that they wanted to buy from
Northwest led us to the posture that we were not an agency that could go up and buy blocks
of power and use them within the agency.

We have many agency members who over the years

now have developed their own baseload generation.

Northern California Power Agency has a

geothermal power plant going, has another under construction right now.
electric project under construction.

There's a hydro-

We have, some of the group have purchased coal

fired generation by buying part of a plant in New Mexico. and we have a number of those
vehicles available.
So the needs of the different agencies were such that no one felt it was necessary
or available to have bulk purchases by an agency itself, so we have gone under the basis
that we looked at the Northwest as the abilitj to supply our individual needs.

Each of

us have done our own studies and our own concepts of how we can economically portray this
program.

The economics were there for most

summer peak capacity.

o~

the public utilities strictly to buy

Summer peak capacity is a very available and valuable resource and

is available in Northwest.
Exchange programs, such as those that have been entered into in the past by L.A.D.W.P.
and Southern Cal Edison with the Northwest,
our baseload generation which is excess in

,.,,~re
th~

program.
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also vehicles that we could look to with

wintertime, be able to use an exchange

Again, one of the things I think that's been very valuable in this process, as Mr.
Imbrecht expressed, was the ability for the first time and since I've been involved in
ic power and I got involved in 1974 when I was first appointed as the commissioner
from the City of Redding, to be able to sit down, not

with all the publics at the

same table in California, but to sit down with the publics and the privates and work
to develop a project which all of us felt independently in our own studies was a
ect that would benefit the citizens and the ratepayers in California.
I think Mr. Imbrecht has expressed to some degree the impacts which we are discussing
with the Northwest on the price of power.

We firmly believe that an interconnection with

the Northwest that is tied to a location and a place that give us access to all of the
different utilities in the Northwest is going to create a competition up there as well.
What you have currently with the connection at Malin is a connection with Bonneville Power
Authority, and as long as you re only connected to Bonneville everything else, as Mr.
Imbrecht said, funnels through them.

We feel that the third AC line is going to be

structured in such a manner that we will have access to other entities in the Northwest
who we can then buy from independetly.

And those kinds of things create competition, not

for the types of power whether you want surplus energy, whether you want firm, whether
you vvant summer peak capacity, whether you're exchanging for energy, those kind of things
can be worked out down the contracts with the agencies and you can take and pick which
of those has the best deal, which of those have the kinds of surpluses and needs that you
have, which have the energy you want
for reserves.

Those are the kinds of things that we're looking for.

So the agency

with the lOU's the memorandum of understanding which split

this process into being.
contracts.
commenc

who has the capacity you want, how you can use it

We have since gone through that process to the environmental

We're in the process now of

environmental studies for the whole line

from Southern Oregon on down into the Tracy/Tesla

second

of that.

area.

We are through the

We have done corridor studies and we are now into routing studies.

We've held public workshops throughout the whole north state to try to get as much public
as we can into the process, and we'll be continuing on through the rest of this year
and into late '86 just doing the environmental reports.
process.
Federal side.

TANC is the lead agency for the

Western Power Administration is the lead agency for the EIS process on the
We are coordinating those two processes together to make sure they fit.

Once we have gone through this

process we then submit those documents to the in-

vestor-owned utilities who submit those to the Public Utilities Commission for their
certification process. So we're not talking about a short process.

We're talking about a

long time in the study, both from the environmental, the economic, the feasibility of it,
the engineering of it.

These processes will take a long time and have a lot of input.

The investor-owned utilities require the certification by the Public Utilities Commission.
We in the public sector require that we go back to our communities and be able to convince our communities that the financing of this line is in their best interest.
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The

city councils or district boards have the authority to go through that process with an
ordinance and referendum.

There are referendum available to the people of the community

if they feel it is not economic or not beneficial for that entity not to participate.

So

we have a great deal of regulatory oversight, both in the public side and in the private
side to get through with this project.
In going through the questions, we've attempted in the paper I presented to you, to
address all these questions.

I don't know what degree you wish me to review them, but I

can because we do not feel, as I've indicated, that we're talking about energy blackmail.
We feel we're talking about a competition program, the availability to open up the total
Western system.

This opens up the marketplace throughout the system because of the

increased transmission capacity.

I might indicate with surpluses you're looking at the

year 1991 for this line to come into being.
surpluses will be less here in 1991.

Many of the studies in existence show that

There is a potential of surpluses not existing in

the Northwest other than the fact that you have BC hydro.
west surpluses still expect

surpl~s,

BC hydro, when certain North-

and that can be used to bring in our area.

But we're talking about a great deal of variety in the numbers of entities we can
deal with in the long-term future and we're looking at a transmission line that we're
looking at 40 years or better of use, and so we're not looking at something that's just
within the next 5, 10 or 15 years, but something that gives us a great deal of availability
in resources that are both planned and under construction in the Northwest to date, and
the BC hydro program of Site C, which they are very definitely talking about building.
We're looking to the interconnection with Southern California with the diversity among
our own state.

We're looking at the ability, because of this function of cooperation

among the utilities to work longer and harder at cooperation of utilities in the future,
both as to sharing power supplies and power need.

So we think those areas are fairly

well identified in our project and we feel the project is well worth going forward with
under those concepts.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
to the areas of need?
MR. PUGH:
Pacific Gas

Mr. Pugh, how will the municipal utilities transmit that power

Will wheeling be involved?

Most of all of the publics today have wheeling contracts with either

and Electric, Southern Cal Edison, or other areas who own the transmission

within the particular geographic sections.

The power will be wheeled to the central

substations and from those central substantions the, pursuant to existing contracts, be
wheeled into

the other areas.

Part of the memorandum of understanding was that there

wou1d he wtweling provided from Tesla to Midway on the Pacific Cas and Electric system,
and then wheeling would be provided

by

Southern Cal Edison from their location at

Midway to the southern cities for their share of this project power that comes down.

So

the wheeling contracts among the agencies here will be handled under current contractual
rights which exist with the private-owned utilities who own the current transmission grid
within the system in California.
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

The $64,000 question--SB 1430 that I've introduced calls upon the

PUC to determine guaranteed minimal levels of power supply sufficient to justify the new
construction, contractual limitations on the power adequate to ensure the cost effectiveness of the project, and to demonstrate the availability of surplus power over the life of
the project, and I note in your conclusion you recommend that that not be enacted.

Now

it seems to me that if everything has gone along the way you say it should go along, you'd
have no problem with the legislation.

MR. PUGH:

What's the problem?

Basically I think, Senator, the problem with the legislation is I see no

way that we can today crystal ball the guarantee for 40 years that we're going to have all
of those things that you're talking about on an open book.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

MR. PUGH:

I

think we're •..

Then why do it?

Because I think you have to take a look at what is likely to occur, but

I'm not going to give you a guarantee that it's going to occur.

I think the likelihood

is there and the likelihood is different than a guarantee that is there.

I

think that

your bill is asking us as publics and privates together to enter into some kind of a contract where BPA guarantees or somebody there is going to guarantee that for 40 years they're
to supply you with "x" amounts of megawatts of power at such-and-such a rate, and I

go

don t think we can do that in California.
don't

I

couldn't get that out of PG&E today and I

else, nor would they want to give one.

And I don't think that anybody would

want to enter into that type of a guaranteed program.
We feel, based upon historical data, based upon projections and loads and on needs of
all of the entities involved, that this matter is an economic and long-term benefit for
the areas, but I can't give you a sure fire guarantee that that's going to be and I think
this is the problem we have with that kind of legislation.
CHAIRt1AN ROSENTHAL:

MR. PUGH:

Could you guarantee it for 15 years, not 40?

Currently, under Federal law, no.

Bonneville Power Administration cannot

enter into a contract with term of a guarantee under Federal statutes.

They're forbidden

to do so.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay, I have a problem trying to deal with somebody who created

for themselves and can't get out of it, and so now you want me to deal with
those people who built five plants which are never going to be in operation, only one of
which is there, and now I'm supposed to deal with those people on some sort of a future
relationship to provide at a reasonable cost on a guaranteed period of time for access.
It's very difficult to deal with somebody who goes broke and now he wants me to say,
, you know, I'm willing to spend $500 million from the ratebase to purchase some power
from a source that I don't have confidence in."

MR. IMBRECHT:
point out to you.

Well, Senator, may I try that for a moment?

Just a couple of things I'd

First, there is no way that Northwest is going to be able to

bail

out "WHOOPS" on the basis of any kind of deal that would go forward in California.

It is

simply economically impossible and I think that boogie man ought to be laid to rest at
-55-

the outset

of any discussion.

It's not in the cards.

It's not the system, circum-

stances that will make it possible, etc., and there's not an entity in California that
wouldn't turn their backs on such a deal and walk away, even with the investment that's
been made to date.
As a practical matter, it does have the prospect of increasing their revenue stream,
but in no way in a volume necessary to solve Whoops.

It may affect their ability to meet

some of their Federal repayment issues and that's obviously one of the carrots that we
were discussing with Senator Keene, but we're not talking about something in the magnitude
that "WHOOPS" is, which $5 billion, give or take.
Let's put some things in another perspective.
that's an upper scale limit.

$500 million for the transmission line,

We're tried in all these discussions to air on the liberal

side, if you will, based on some of the mistakes that are made in terms of other power
projects in the past who underestimating what the cost is and then having to come back
at a later point and swallow hard with egg on your face and say(Inaudibl0 cost overruns.
As a practical matter though, we think the project will be substantially less costly than
that.
What does that mean in terms of comparisons?

Well, if you want to talk Diablo,

$5 billion for 2,200 megawatts, and even if we took the worst case scenario we're talking
one-tenth of that for a capacity that's at least two-thirds, frankly, a little bit in
excess of that.

That's not to browbeat any project.

It's simply to put

thin~in

a little

bit of perspective.
Finally, I do think it's likely that we're going to see some rate assurances that I
believe will be sufficient to allow the PUC to make the kind of prudent judgement which
they need to make with respect to investor-owned utilities.

Whether it will be 15 years

or not I doubt it will be that long because there are some exigencies in Federal law, but
as the same time, I think that the PUC will and as they should look at the physical
circumstances of the marketplace in the Northwest and I think they will understand as we do
from those analyses, that the surpluses and the demand up there simply don't mesh.

The

surpluses are much greater than what the demand is and even if you prognosticate that all
of their industries completely recover and all of the historic growth patterns and the
rest of it, it 1 s only under those circumstances that you see the surplus dissipating in
the early '90s.

We're talking worst case scenario here when we're talking about the early

'91 situation.
Finally, the BC option, as we call it, is a very important one.

British Columbia

government has reversed a decades old policy of constructing generation capacity only for
domestic consumption and then sale of any surplus they might have.

Premier

Bennett, after

several meetings here in California with the Governor and myself and all of the senior
executives of our major utilities announced about a year ago now that they would construct for the purposes of export alone, and they already have two, and perhaps as many
as three projects fully environmentally permitted and ready to go, assuming they have
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access to the California marketplace.

This is an issue of great importance to Canada.

It's one which has been raised to the bilateral trade negotiations that were negotiated
their prime minister and President Reagan in the

of this year.

It ranks from

their perspective in terms of importance equal to the natural gas issues thatyou discussed this morning.

I think that the economic necessities mean that BC will have access

to the California marketplace.

It's been important to the Los Angeles Department of Water

and Power and other utilities in the past, and it will be important continuing into the
future.
One of the participants in our discussion is the most recently retired president of
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and I don't want to parrot any utility's viewpoint and
I don't want in any sense to suggest that that's the case here, but he made a very
telling comment at one of our most recent negotiating sessions.

When he was talking

largely to his own peers who were the senior executivesin the Northwest and said, "Gentlemen, let's get down to the bottom line.

If we're statesmen we can produce a deal that is

beneficial to all the people in the Pacific Coast."

Ultimately, I think any energy expert,

whether you want to talk about Hunter and Amory Lovins,

who represent one perspective

infue community, or the utility community itself, I don't believe it makes sense fundafor us to move towards a

energy distribution system where we take

advantage of the climactic differences between the regions rather than building and
and building and operating like a small boat in an ocean all by ourselves.
doesn'

make

sense.

It

The only impediment are human structures that we have

created and it's frankly a challenge for all of us in public service to try to be statessystem that we know will benefit the people from British Columbia to the
Mexican border, and perhaps
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

Mexico as well.

Senator Keene.

I m a bit confused by the response to Senator Rosenthal's question

about SB 1430 because it seems to me that your answer was in the nature of the fact that
the Northwest power producers are in such a sorry condition that they're not likely to
a guarantee of a minimum level of power supply sufficient to justify the new
construction, that they're not liable to want to ensure the cost effectiveness of our project.

're not likely to be in a position to demonstrate the availability of surplus

power over the life of the project.

If that wasn't the position, maybe you could re-ex-

because I didn't understand it.

a

It seems to me that if they are in such

situation to develop the California marketplace and the purchasing power and

the needs of the California marketplace, that they're going to want to do exactly all of
those

That we can get them to do exactly the things that SB 1430 requires.

Why

is that not the case?
}ffi. PUGH:

Well, Senator Keene, I think the problem is I guess in perception as to

what we say to guarantee.

I say they will not and would not prudently enter into a

fixed price, long-term contract if they could, and now we'll have to talk about the
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investor-owned utilities or separate utilities other than Bonneville Power because they
have impediments to those, Federal statute impediments to long-term contracts of that
nature.
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. PUGH:

Federal statute?

They're impediments, they are required to have withdrawal provisions in

their contracts, they're required to have limited time constraints on their contracts, all
set by Federal statute.

They cannot enter into a long-term fixed contract for a number of

years.
SENATOR KEENE:

Well, why then wouldn't you support SB 1430 to the extent that it's

possible consistent with Federal law to do so, or why wouldn't you try to have Federal law
changed to make it better for us to have a secure investment?
MR. PUGH:

Well, Senator, I'd like to get the line built by 1991 and what you're

saying means we're being very realistic having dealt with just the process of going
through, this line through Congress by itself.
SENATOR KEENE:

Well, we can't pass a law.

The Federal law is supreme.

We can't pass

a law that conflicts with Federal law which you're telling me now that SB 1430 has limitations on it.

Well, why can't we pass a bill up to the point of those limitations is

effective in providing us what guarantees we can get?
MR. PUGH:

Well, Senator, I guess the basic problem I have is is it really necessary?

Don't we already have enough regulatory proections with the Public Utilities Commission?
SENATOR KEENE:

You say so in your report.

California regulatory agency involvement.

You say we already have extensive

You don't cite what it is and then you say,

" ... and in fact regulatory approval was a critical path constraint to early development
of the project."

I don't really understand that and the Energy Commission has no

siting authority, the PUC has no authority over municipal utilities.

Where is all this

regulatory authority that's being exercised on this project?
MR. PUGH:

Well, because this is not a municipal utility program by itself.

This is

a joint program in which the investor-owned utilities, as I indicated earlier, have an
obligation and are required to go through the CPUC

for their CPUC certification for

their participation in this project.
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. PUGH:

Only for their participation in the project.

And as I went through the process we go through the environmental phases.

We then present it for certification.

We do not go to begin construction until after they

have PUC approval.
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. PUGH:
everything.

But the considerations there are environmental, they're not economic.

No, they're consideration for certification are economic, environmental,

They have to certify that Pacific Gas and Electric and ...

SENATOR KEENE:
MR. PUGH:

So you're talking about CPUC?

That's right.

SENATOR KEENE:

I was going to your environmental impact report requirements.
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MR. PUGH:
determination.

They have to go to CPUC.

In other words, TANC makes an environmental

Once we've made the environmental determination we then submit that with

the investor-owned utilities who make application to the Public Utilities Commission for
certification of the project so that they may participate in the project and participate
in construction of the porject.

We then have the process of CPUC certification which

certifies their participation which includes the environmental, the financial, the ability
for ratebase and everthing else with regard to the participation by Southern Cal Edison,
San Diego Gas and Electric, and Pacific Gas and Electric.
SENATOR KEENE:

I don't know if what you're saying means that CPUC can reject this

project for precisely the same reasons that fails to satisfy the requirements, the guarantees that are required by SB 1430.
MR. PUGH:

Is that what you're saying?

They would have that right without 1430 if they did not determine that,

as I understand the rules, maybe Doug can help me here, but as I understand the rules
with the Public Utilities Commission, they have the right to deny the certification of
this project within their own existing guidelines on the process of feasibility, economics,
need, use, whatever else you want.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Why don't we then--let's move now to Don Vial, the President

of the PUC, for his presentation, and then in answer to the questions we've raised in
terms of my bill, SB 1430.
MR. VIAL:

Yes, I do have a prepared statement that goes into the details of how we

confront the cost effectiveness of the expanded intertie.
far is a clear indication of the complexity of this issue.
we can just deal with in isolation.
in

I think what has been said thus
That it's not something that

I think Chairman Imbrecht has done a very good job

out the parameters of this and trying to bring it together.

We in the PUC have

a very strong interest in working very closely with the Energy Commission and putting our
best foot forward in Caifornia to get the expanded tieline to accomplish all of the
objectives that Chairman Imbrecht laid out.
The problem

that we have in the PUC is that we have to deal with a lot of reality

in terms of the actual prices that we're assuming in dealing with the economic feasibility
of these tielines.

That's a pretty complex situation.

It's quite obvious if you look at,

if we had our druthers, as Chairman Imbrecht pointed out, that with all that capacity up
there and our needs down here, it's to the advantage of both regions to have an expanded
intertie so that we can interface with each other; and in fact if there were no barriers
to competitive relationship, we'd be all home free and we'd be all very happy, but as
Chairman Imbrecht pointed out, there are a lot of institutional barriers in between.

And

those institutional barriers have a lot to do with the price that is paid, both for firm
and for nonfirrn energy and whether or not those lines in fact are going to be feasible.
The truth of the matter is that we have to reach some accommodation with the Northwest and with Bonneville, particularly, to break down some of the institutional barriers
that have cast a real shadow on the feasibility of this line.
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And in no sense can it be

considered not feasible in the long-term, but on the other hand, if the barriers are not
broken down, it could very well be a serious problem.
were discussing gas.

Gas prices are coming down.

And here again, this morning we

We don't know how long the bubble's

going to last, but in fact, you know, the cost of generation with gas is coming down.
I think that it's been alluded to there's the possibility for a win/win situation here
in working out the problem is the fact that there's a big gap between the incremental cost
of energy produced up North and our so-called avoided or incremental cost.

There's a wide

margin there and there's a lot of room for negotiation and settlement and in that context
it's possible to determine whether or not these lines are going to be truly feasible.
This is what my statement attempts to point out, just exactly how we are looking at these
issues.
Now it's important I think for everyone that is involved in the negotiations and
certainly Chairman Imbrecht has been very much involved in this, along with Pacific Northwest and our own utilities, that they understand that we really have a public responsibility
to get a some pretty hard figures.

And if you can't tie it down with contracts, and you've

heard what's been said about the contracts, there are problems there, that at least we
should know what the ground rules are going to be in the future for dealing with price
relationships.

l think this is what we're talking about when we talk about the need for

predictibility in rates for the future.

If we can't tie down the specific contracts, at

least to know what the ground rules are going to be and how we're going to adjust these.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

That, and I understand what you're saying, but if in fact the

rates in Washington had been reduced to their ratepayers in that area and increased to
California ...
MR. VIAL:

Well, we've got a serious problem and all of us are involved right now

before the FERC in trying to get a handle on the nonfirm rates.

We're still discussing,

believe it or not, before FERC, 1981 rates and we know what's happened to the nonfirm rates,
you know, from 2 to 3 mills they've gone up to 23, 24 and they're going up.

And what is

important to recognize here is that this third line is going to have a lot of capacity
available for nonfirm energy.

When you work out the exchange relationships and work out

the possibilities for firm energy on that line, there's still going to be a lot of capacity
for nonfirm and it's really important to tie down that nonfirm rate if we can.

In fact,

I say that the time is right and I think everyone agree that we've put up with enough
nonsense between--and this applies across the board.

We really should be settling that

nonfirm rate that's dangling before the FERC, come to some conclusions on it, lay out some
ground rules on how we're going to deal with it in the future because we have approached
our incremental cost of energy and as it stands now, some of the prices that are being
advanced just don't look very good in terms of the feasibility of this project.

So if

we're going to really have a win/win situation and we're approaching our avoided cost
prices, it means that the accommodation's going to have to mean some downward adjustment
in that nonfirm rate.
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There is a lot of room for negotiations here, as Chuck Imbrecht has pointed out.
We've got to get on with it and we have to be together in this state on wltat's really
to us.

We want in the PUC to give reliable indicators of how we're looking at

the feasibility so that no one is mislead, so that the Northwest reads us, hears us
and clearly that those nonfirm rates are important just as the firm rates are going to be
And that even if we had the additional capacity, if Bonneville is going to pursue the kind of access policy on the intertie, that all of that excess capacity is not
going to give us Canadian energy without a surcharge by the Northwest.
what the PG&E and others are very concerned about.

And that's exactly

That we don't get surcharged in these

relationships that get developed and this is again a question of how we start breaking
down the institutional barriers one by one to make sure that we get some handle on what
the

rules are going to be for both firm and nonfirm energy in the future.

And

remember, we do have a lot of opportunities for exchange arrangements, but it's unlikely
that we'll have the capacity for the exchange in their direction that there is the potential
for buying energy from them.

And the Canadians have clearly indicated that they want to

invest in projects and sell us energy.
for

We want that energy.

It's important to the PG&E,

, in terms of their long-run goals.
But let me just add one thing.

That the Northwest really has to understand that there

are really a lot of options for California here.

That price is coming down on gas fired

energy and also we have a lot of options in dealing with third party development.

In the

PUC we re going to be looking at what the long-term avoided costs is going to be for future
energy

It's really importnat for us to know what the arrangements can be

with the Northwest and how much we can depend upon purchase power from the Northwest with
some reliabil

, and it's also important for the Northwest to know that we have options

and we're not dependent upon them.
work,

I think that's what's going to make this arrangement

if we can really settle down and they hear us loudly and clearly.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Yes, Senator Russell.

Well, since we've been told that you can't have a guaranteed con-

tract, what kind of assurances can we get that would signal to us that we're ready to put
in $500 million and you as the regulators say, "Yes, that's a good deal and it's a cost
benefit type of a project."
MR. VIAL:

What are we looking for?

No, I think that

m terms

Word of honor, or what?

of specific settlements, for example, I think that

we should be able to settle right now the controversy over the nonfirm rate.

We have a

forum going in FERC and that would be an indication that if we can start chipping away at
this essential problem of the nonfirm rate, we can then be looking at how we ought to be
dealing with nonfirm rates in the future, having some understanding and agreement on how
we're going to be dealing with incremental costs of the system up North, and our avoided
costs, and how we're going to approach some kind of a win/win situation.

That's the

basis on which we need to proceed and I think that if we start chipping away at the
nonfirm problem that has been blowing up in our face, we'll also start chipping away at
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much of the basis for the intertie access policy that has restricted flow of energy to
California on favorable terms.

I think it's the kind of negotiating process where you need

to have kind of a breakthrough.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Is it a process whereby you get a formula based upon avoided costs

or some other kind of things and so this relates to that, and if this goes up, that can
go up, but if this stays down, then that will stay down?

The final result is while it's

not a guarantee, the result that you agree to in the formula produces a certain price that
you can hang your hat on?
MR. VIAL:
it.

Is that we're talking about?

I'm no expert in this in details, and yes, that's the way I'm looking at

I think Chairman Imbrecht looks at it in much the same way.

We have expertise on

our staffs, both the Energy Commission and the PUC, and of course the utilities have it
also.

We can get an understanding on how those formulas might work for the future.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

So if you have a bill like Senator Rosenthal's which maybe relates

to formulas or concepts which are real world concepts, and something happens to this, it
has another effect here which is somewhat predictable, you can nail those down.
MR. IMBRECHT:

You just used the word that we've used in all of the discussions and

that's predictability.

That's not certainty because this is an uncertain world we live in

in terms of energy costs and it's all tied together; and what the Arabs do affects the price
of natural gas, which in turn affects our natural costs, which in turn affects the market,
etc.

I mean it's all a long, long string, but predictability is in fact the thing we're

looking at.
A little historic note,

Senator Rosenthal,

it's not so much what's happened per se

since '81 and the variety of rate changes from Bonneville that we've

called out in our

electricity report and the PUC has talked about as well, it's the utter unpredictability
in the manner in which they have treated California.

The price increases have affected us.

Basically we've gone from a cost-of-service philosophy in terms of what they've charged
us, what it took them to generate it--obviously that's not a lot when the capital costs of
a hydro project have already been amortized--to a what-the-market-will-bear formula, and
the prices in the Northwest have also escalated.

The prices to their consumers have gone

up but not as quickly as they've gone up to the ratepayers in California.

Does that mean

that today our utilities are paying more for Northwest Power than they are for other
generation?

No, to the contrary.

That's not the case.

that's the important thing to always keep focused.

They're still paying less and

Yes, the price has gone way up but

it's still less than anything else we've got in the system.
What we're trying to do is ensure that there is predictability as to what those rate
structures are going to be and to ensure that under no circumstances can we be placed in
a position where those prices would go up beyond what domestic generation would cost us
in California.

That's the manner in which we protect the ratepayer.

I think the issue in

terms of your bill is not so much anybody disagreeing with the necessity for these issues
to be considered.

In fact what I think what we're trying to say is the PUC in fact
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already is doing that and doing it within their own jurisdiction.

And I think probably

what it really would come down to is the question of semantics by which you define
the types of issues that they ought to be satisfied with respect to before allowing
investor-owned participation, rather than the concept whether in fact the PUC
to ensure that they are making a prudent decision.
In terms of the publicly-owned utilities, I think the important thing to remember is
that we're talking about elected officials with a constituency of their own and that's
largely the regulatory check on decisions that are undertaken by the publics.

You can

draw your own conclusions whether you think that's adequate or inadequate or not, but
that's in essence the circumstance we find ourselves in.
MR. VIAL:

Well, we don't need the authority of the legislation.

have the authority.

It's clear that we

We have suggested some amendments that would from our point of view

make it more compatible with the kinds of problems that we're talking about here, and at
the same time make it possible for the Legislature to indicate the kinds of things that
you want us to take into account.

Basically, we are trying to do all the things that you

are suggesting in your bill.
SENATOR KEENE:

Well, on that point, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

Yes.

Then obviously the legislation doesn't impower you, it restrains you.

It causes the PUC to adhere to certain findings before going ahead with the certificate
of--what do they call it, convenience of necessity, or whatever it's called--it requires
that you do certain
MR. VIAL:

first.

That's true.

SENATOR KEENE:

Okay, now you say, "Well, we're going to do those things anyway," and
9

I trust my fellow commissioners, I understand all of that concept.

My question, though,

goes back, my question, though, Don, goes back to what was said by Mr. Pugh and that was
that you can't get these things out of the Northwest Power people, out of Bonneville and
the others.

So if you can't get them, they can't get them, and we can't get them legis-

latively, how are you going to be able to get them?

With all the good faith in the world

that the commission might have.
MR. IMBRECHT:

You can't get what's defined in the bill, but what we're saying is you

can get adequate assuances to
terms of semantics.
frankly, in my own
forward

ify the line and that's what I was talking about in

Let me offer a couple of things that I believe we can get, and
have to get in order for anyone to be confident about going

whether it be public or private utilities in the state.

in the rate structure from Bonneville Power Administration.

We need predictability

That's a statement that's

been delivered to them with such consistency that they must be mind numb ...
SENATOR KEENE:
a way to get it.
MR. IMBRECHT:

Okay, but how are you going to get it?

How are you going to get it?

The Rosenthal bill suggests

That's not semantics.

Frankly, they have a lot of flexibility about how they structure
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their rates.

They are both a utility and a PUC all rolled into one.

They announce a rate

structure, then the administrator goes and sits as a member of the PUC and decides whether
his own judgment was prudent or not.

That's literally the way it works.

And then it goes

before FERC and that's sort of an independent check, but of course, they've got too many
TVA's and BPA's to worry about and so it's largely--unless there's an agrievous violation
of the process--it's upheld.
But there are also political levers in the Northwest and that has to do with the
economics of them being able to continue to sell to California.

There are investor-owned

and public utilities up there ...
SENATOR KEENE:

But once the pipeline is built, once the pipleine is built that

leverage is lost because we're not going to make a white elephant out of the pipeline, so
MR. IMBRECHT:

It isn't going to be built without those kinds of predictability

checks built in ••.
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. IMBRECHT:

But it's those kinds, it's those kinds that worry me.
Some of the kinds of things we're talking about frankly, if you want

to get down to the nitty-gritty, there are ways of doing it.

Bonneville is tied to the

Preference Act on the Federal level in terms of their ability to cut off agreements and
so forth, recall power, etc.

That doesn't mean that their investor-owned utilities or

their other publics are tied to that same set of restrictions and there is some discussion
underway, for example, for them to in essence market the power to the Northwest, in essence
have Bonneville sell their share to the lOU's and they in turn sell to California.

And

suffice it to say, there are mechanisms, some of which are being spawned right now by
utility attorneys, etc.

We're pretty confident that such approaches can creatively be

embraced that will allow the PUC to make the kinds of findings that do justify the line.
I'd also encourage you to take a look at the history of the first two Northwest
Interties where similar questions were raised and there's a very sense of public record on
this issue, and also take a look at the history of what the benefits to the two regions
have been.

The problem from the Northwest's perspective has been, part of it in the last

couple of years has been we're getting even for a perception that somehow California took
advantage of the situation too long.

We negotiated prices on the spot market.

We were

three and four mills kilowatt hour for energy while their own ratepayers were paying
18 and 19.

You can obviously understand the oolitical oroblems and certainly within

that reason.
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. IMBRECHT:

And now we're paying 26 to 30 mills?
A lot of that has been dissipated today and I think that it's impor-

tant to look at it in terms of the entire historical context.

This is really not a good

forum to explain all that ..•
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. IMBRECHT:

No.

but I'll make myself available to explain in detail to respond to

-64-

those questions.
MR. VIAL:

May I make a point?

Senator, you are obviously on the crucial issue and

you're really--we in the PUC must deal with that issue and deal with it effectively.

Now

first of all, it is possible for the utilities, the private utilities to enter into agreements with the other IOUs up there.

The problem is to get access to that line.

All the

intertie capacity in the world isn't going to break down the access policy of Bonneville
unless we work out

an arrangement to break that down. That's an integral part of

making this line feasible and in the process we feel we'll get some price adjustment.
What I want to point out to you that when you talk about feasibility and what we're
looking at as I point out in my statement--the Northwest's analysts talk in terms of
options of 50 mills per killowatt hour.

Now if you look at that just for a moment, the

cost of the line is going to be just 25 mills.

Now between that and 50 mills you can see

what the maximum amount might be for this thing to have feasibility is that there isn't
much room.
it.

You can get gas-generated energy today at 30 mills or close to

So it's this kind of a process that we're going to go through.

It's really impor-

tant for us in working with the Energy Commissioniliat the PUC gives good signals on how
we look at cost effectiveness.
statement before you today.

That's why I took the pains in laying it out in this

Those are the kinds of things that we'll be looking at.

the problems are not insurmountable.

But

I really feel that the big problem in large part is

being able to break down that access policy

because if we can break that down,with the

additional capacity there'll be a lot of room for the private utilities to negotiate and
the feasibility of these lines greatly depends upon those negotiations with the private
ut

ities and the price that they can get firm and nonfirm energy at.
SENATOR KEENE:

But your whole statement is replete with arbitrariness and bias on

the part of Bonneville and a failure to protect on the part of FERC.
MR. VIAL:

That's right.

SENATOR KEENE:

That's all over the place here and you're telling us not to worry.

[Laughs.]
MR. VIAL.

No, I'm not telling you not to worry.

I'm saying that we have to be to-

gether on this in our negotiations and I can assure you that we're working very closely
with the Energy Commission and the others to make sure that we get our interests forward
because we could be taken to the cleaners on this thing.
MR. IMBRECHT:

Both the PUC and we and our utilities have been taking utterly con-

sistent positions in regulatory and judicial proceedings relative to these isses.

Now

admittedly, it's been a frustrating circumstance because as I explained to you the BFA
is an entity largely unto itself.

That's why I'm convinced this is only going to happen

as a result of hard ball and to put it to you bluntly, political negotiations.

And if

they're left to act in an environment that is somehow a vacuum is not going to happen.
are doing our best, I assure you, and I'll be happy to detail to you privately what the
steps are that are underway to ensure that the realities of this situation are clearly
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We

understood by the parties in the Northwest, as well as by our own.

But we're not going

to go forward, period, unless this is a cost effective investment for our people.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Well, I think we could make some recommended changes in the

legislation because really what I'd like to do is send a message.
MR. PUGH:

I think that's very true, Senator.

One thing I'd like to comment on also

is that one of the problems historically you've gotten is again the access is limited to
one location, to one set of tielines.

The concept of the new line was to give multiple

ties to that line outside of the jurisdiction of Bonneville totally and if we can get
multiple ties so we have direct access to other utilities, that again developes the
potential for competition, develops

the potential to access other utilities as opposed to

Bonneville and gives us some ability to work on the price on that basis.

And that's one of

the concepts of this line as to the connection point being shown and the negotiations on
that connection point.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. PUGH:

To what extent does Bonneville really need us?

I think if you look at their rate repayment structure and their rate

repayment program, with the power--if they don't sell us power that's being developed up
there and spill that power or dump it, they still have to make the same amount of money to
make the repayment program.

And to make that repayment program, then it means they have to

up the rates to their ratepayers or to their industrial users or the DSis or whatever else
you wnat up there.

So they need to maximize their sales to be able to quantify and gen-

erate the revenues they need to make their repayment program and with the (Inaudible)
rearing it's head again back in Washington, D.C., I think they're going to be looking
even harder at that.

And that's an area that we have to be careful about too because if

the repayment programs come back into effect then we have another area we have to look at
very carefully.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Is there a lot of pressure for the Federal Government on them to

repay?
MR. PUGH:

Yes, there is.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

All right.

I'd like to call upon Mr. Oglesby, PG&E, to get

your input.
MR. DOUGLAS OGLESBY:

Thank you very much.

One of the advantages of being last on

the panel is that my colleagues have so thoroughly ventilated many of the critical issues,
but I think I can provide a bit of a perspective from the standpoint of at least one
investor-owned utility.
Very simply, in our opinion the third line is seriously threatened by the anti-competitive behavior of PPA.

PPA controls most of the intertie access in the Northwest and

therefore controls the flow of power into California.

Through it's access policy it's

eliminated price competition among the Northwest sellers of energy, and has prevented the
ability of all utilities in California to be able to shop around for the cheapest source
of energy.
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As important, if not more important, it has cut off access to, as Chairman Imbrecht
pointed out, BC Hydro which wants to build new facilities solely for export and that
really is not going to happen unless we can get access to BC Hydro.

Quite simply, BPAs

policies could increase electric costs to California consumers as much as $100 million
annually.

In the face of these unwarranted price increases which further subsidize the

consumers of Northwest energy, which if I'm not mistaken already enjoy the lowest energy
prices in the country, I think it's safe to say that there is a serious question about
the economic justification for the third line.
To give you an example, assuming only nonfirm energy is available to the California/
Oregon Transmission Project and no capacity of benefits, Northwest energy would have to be
priced at no more than 12 mills per killowatt hours in today's costs in order for the
project to break even.

We've provided some information to President Vial and his people

and has a lot of discussions with everyone here on these issues.
BPAs access policy has precluded the existence of power at that cost.

In fact, the

cheapest nonfirm energy in the Northwest is now above ..•
SENATOR KEENE:

I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

A clarifying question?

Yes.

In order for the project to break even nonfirm energy would have to

be priced at 12 mills?
MR. OGLESBY:
MR.

No more than 12 mills.

I'm sorry, yes.

No more than 12 mills.

In addition to the fixed cost of 25?

MR. OGLESBY:

That's correct.

Those are embedded costs.

I'm talking about just

nonfirm energy.
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. OGLESBY:
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. OGLESBY:

And the current rate is what?
It exceeds 20 mills.
So they would have to reduce the rate?
That's right.

justify the line solely on energy.
line on its own particular needs.

That's assuming no capacity benefits.

You're trying to

Each participant in the project has to justify the
One entity may need peaking capacity, some other

entity may need long-term firm power, other entities may try to justify it on the basis
of taking advantage of seasonal diversity exchanges.

We've talked about our exchanging

capacity during our low period which would be in the winter for their capacity during
their low period which would be in the summer, and there seems to be the possibility of a
mesh there.

Others are looking at things like capacity reserves.

Frankly, that's how

PG&E is trying to justify the third line is something that we've called capacity reserves.
SENATOR KEENE:

I'm somewhat confused because what is the likelihood, first of all,

of BPA cutting in half its current charge for nonfirm energy and keeping it there?
MR. OGLESBY:
SENATOR KEENE:

I would say not great.
Okay.

Then these other benefits, these offsetting benefits.

they relate to the requirement of 12 in order to make the project pay?
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How do

MR. IMBRECHT: Because each entity may not need to justify the project solely on the
basis of nonfirm energy.

PG&E has a surplus of capacity.

That's the same issue with

respect to cogeneration construction in their service territory.
they've got Helms in their system currently.
at this line from an energy standpoint.

They've got Diablo,

They don't need capacity so they're looking

Other utilities, however, need capacity.

Then

there is a value associated with purchasing capacity, as well as energy from the Northwest.
We're really talking about two different commodities as a practical matter and he's
referencing now what would make this line from a nonfirm energy standpoint attractive to
Pacific Gas and Electric.
MR. OGLESBY:

If all we were looking for to justify the line was nonfirm energy,

then you're right, Senator.

They'd have to cut their costs by roughly half in order for

us to be able to justify the line.

We would like to take advantage of nonfirm energy at

times when we need it, but there are other things that we're looking for in the line as
well.

I mention a reserve capacity.

we can benefit from.
Northwest.

That's something in the longer term that we think

We don't know if that's available at an economic price in the

We've been in discussions with BPA concerning that.

In fact, as recently as

last week ago today I was in Portland talking with BPA trying to outline some kind of
contract, establish some sort of principles that would enable us to look like we're
going to have something economic.

But I'm not really optimistic as I sit here talking

to you that we're going to be able to come up with something that's economic, but the one
thing I can assure you is that I have absolute confidence that President Vial and his
colleagues on the Public Utilities Commission are not about to certify Pacific Gas and
Electric Company's participation in this project unless we can make that kind of showing
and I think that's really the important point.

In fact, that in my judgment is one of

the flaws in SB 1430.
l t seems to me, ancl you identified it, Senator, that rather than authorizing the

PubLic Utilities Commission to consider other things than it does not now consider, it
constrains the PUC.

It does that, but it also constrains the ability of the utilities

here to negotiate cost effective arrangements.

The investor-owned utilities, as we

talked about, are subject to the review of the PUC and we can't commit construction funds
to projects without first obtaining a certificate.

The PUC will evaluate all of the

concerns that you've listed in your bill, plus many more.
is it restricts our ability to negotiate contracts.

The problem as I see it though

It would preclude certain economical

energy purchases, such as non firm energy purchases, because those can't be arranged years
in advance.

I can't sit here and negotiate a contract with BPA, or indeed any Northwest

utility, BPA or not, for nonfirm prices in 1995.
year.

I probably can't even do it for next

That's something that available in eftect on the spot market.
In fact, if I can refer back and Chairman Imbrecht was absolutely correct when he

mentioned the benefits on the existing Pacific intertie.

One reason the existing Pacific

intertie was such great benefit to the consumers to California was we were able to take
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advantage of nonfirm energy prices, that is to say hydroelectric-generated energy, in the
1970s during period of rapidly escalating oil and gas prices, and we didn't have to use
our fossil fuel power plants in order to generate that power.
Northwest.

We could get it from the

Now if SB 1430 had been the law at the time the Pacific intertie was con-

structed and we had to make the kind of showing required under SB 1430 in order to obtain
a certificate from the Public Utilities Commission, then the chances are we would not have
been able to avail ourselves of those great benefits during the 1907s.

In fact, there's

a possibility the line wouldn't have been built at all.
There's been a lot of discussion here with reference to Mr. Pugh about the, how the
municipalities fit into SB 1430, but unless I misread the bill, I don't think SB 1430
applies to municipal-owned utilities.

It applies only to investor-owned utilities because

it's triggered on the certification of the Public Utilities Commission who's jurisdiction
does not extend to municipal utilities.

I think that's problem for a couple of reasons.

The first is it may well restrict unduly investor-owned utilities from taking advantage
of some of these nonfirm energy benefits and other flexibilities to adapt to changing
economic conditions, but it doesn't restrict the muncipal utilities from doing that.

That

can result in the municipal utilities, and I certainly don't begrudge them getting as
many benefits as they can for their own ratepayers, but the fact is the investor-owned
utilities do represent over 70 percent of the citizens of California.

We would not be

able to take advantage of those benefits.
I think, and I think this is a very important point, that any state policy or any
state

should include all utilities because the important point as I see it is

to strengthen the bargaining position of the utilities in California.
SB 1430 is the

I'm not sure

vehicle to achieve a result that we all want to achieve, and that's

to ensure that the line isn't built if it's not economic.

Conversely, that it is built if

it is economic and one doesn't follow from the other, believe me.

And secondly, that we're

some fashion able to influence the energy policies in the Northwest.
There may well be a role for the Legislature to play.

We've done a lot of thinking

in our house and talked with some of President Vial's staff about the possibility of some
sort of state supervised negotiation by utilities as a group.
it.

We really haven't developed

This is a thorny problem trying to infuence Northwest policies, but if there was some

fashion that all of the utilities could join together, fight a cartel with a strong negotiat

position, then maybe we could have some kind of influence on the Northwest.

I

would think that the thing we would want to do here is to find some mechanism for
increasing the bargaining position of all of the utilities in the south.

If you don't

include all of the utilities then you have a risk of BPA being able to play off one group
another and that's not going to help anybody.

It would be to the ultimate detri-

ment of all of our citizens.
I think one point that President Vial made is the congruent interests of everybody in
California.

I really want to underscore that because the interests in this area of the
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investor-owned utilities or the municipal utilities, of the Energy Commission or the
Public Utilities Commission, clearly the Legislature as reflected in your bill, Senator
Rosenthal.

Everybody in California is the same, is absolutely identical here and that's

to try to get the cheapest possible power and much fairer allocation of benefits between
the North and the South and get those benefits down to California.

We're trying to reduce

energy prices to 20-some-odd-million people in California and we all need to work together
on that.
One final note and I'll shut up.

There's been some talk about the efforts we need to

take at the FERC in an effort to try to infuence the nonfirm energy price.

I certainly

wholeheartedly support those efforts and some of our lawyers have been litigating with
attorneys for the Energy Commission and the Public Utilities Commission at the rate

pro~

ceedings in the FERC, but unfortunately, whether it's a standard of review or politics or
whatever, we haven't been all that successful at the FERC.
I think sticks out.

To give you one example that

President Vial mentioned the 1981-1982 nonfirm hearings.

Unless I'm

1nistaken, I believe the initial decision of the administrative law judge in that case in
fact reversed BBA's decision on the nonfirm rate but reversed it because it was not too
high, but because it was too low; and recommended a higher rate and that's now on exception
to the commission and we don't know yet know whether the commission is going to buy that.
Tlte problem is that the standard of review of the FERC in reviewing nonregional rate proceedings of BPA is not what we would likeit to be.
and we just finished litigating

a

But still that's the one forum we have

1983 nonregional rate case.

We don't yet have a

decision and in fact I think the briefs are just being submitted this week, but we hope
for a better result.
MR. PUGH:

I'm not optimistic though.

I'll be happy to answer any questions.

Excuse me, one factual issue, Senator, before you leave if I might?

I

think the number was bandied around about the cost of the line and it actually comes out
somewhere between the 5 and 10 mill range is the cost rather than the 25; 5 to 10 mills is
the cost of the line.
MR. lMBRECHT:

What that does to the arithemetic does not require a halving of

existing nonfirm rate but basically suggests that existing nonfirm rate is roughly in the
ballpark, and I don't want to use that as a negotiating position going into the discussions
with the Northwest, but I think you ought to know the true cost (Inaudible)

and that's

based on an assumption of $400 million cost to the line which is neither high nor low.
Thelowis about a quarter of a million, the high is about $500 million.

In either case,

we're not talking 25 mills by any stretch.
And I would say finally that the point that has been of use to California to date in
these discussion is we have had a pretty historic sense of unanimity between the interests
in California in terms of dealing with the Northwest and that's why we've gotten at least
as rar as we have in the last two years.

Two years ago L can

LL'

11 you that there were

~J

lot more people on the horizon that were naysayers and frankly didn't think we'd ever get
a memorandum of understanding.
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

Senator Keene.

Yes, I have a question

Mr.

and Mr. Vial as soon as he's

available.

MR. VIAL:
of this line.

Excuse me, I was

don't think we should be

over the cost

My reference to the 25 mills is on the top of page, aboutthe fifth page.

I do refer to the basis for the calculation so that if there's disagreement on that, I
think we ought to get to it.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

MR. VIAL:
about it.

I don't think that should hang us up.

We didn't get a copy of that.

I can tell you what we said and if this is incorrect, talk to our staff

I say at the bottom

of the page:

"If present BPA policies continue adding the

high EPA rate for nonfirm energy to the cost of the line might well make the third line a
very

benefit for the Northwest and a net added cost for California.

California utilities for California's
the third line carries 3.1 billion
can be translated to 25 mills per

The cost to

of the line would be over $500 million.

kilowatt hours of power annually, costs of the line
kilowatt hour.

Adding the BPA rate for nonfirm energy

of 23 mills to that 25 mills, cost of the line gives a total of nearly 50 mills."
that's what's in there now.

MR. OGLESBY:

If

Now

If it's incorrect, I think we ought to correct it.

I think an

point--I don't have the data with which to calcu-

late the cost of the line in mills per kilowatt hour--but one point, and I meant to make
this earlier in response to your
the wheel

, I think it was yours, Senator Rosenthal, about

obligation for the municipal utilities.

Pacific Gas and Electric
1 of the participants so
order to meet

obl

as well as obligating PG&E to provide wheeling services
can receive the benefit of their allocation.

But in

ion south of Tesla, our initial studies--admittedly preliminary,

're certainly
HOU and

1,000 megawatts of bidirectional transmission

to

from Tesla to Midway substations,

The MOU for the third line obligates

this direction--will

meet other

our system south of Tesla.

us to meet that obligation

that we already have by a number of upgrades in
And these upgrades include what appears to be about an 85-mile

additional stretch of 500 KV line between Los Banos and Gates, which in effect completes
a three lines all the way from Tesla to
to cost about $130 million.

That may

That additional line segment we estimate
account for what some of that disparity

between 10 and 25 mils, if that's being rolled in, and it also may account for the overall
costs we've heard today in excess of $500 million when the feeling of the participants in
the California/Oregon Transmission Project is that the project from Tesla north would be
closer to $400 million than the $500 million.
MR. IMBRECHT:
~ffi.

OGLESBY

MR. IMBRECHT:

I add that only to ...

Even if that were the case that would not account for the disparity.
Certainly not.
And I think that what we're talking about is a difference in terms of

assumptions about the operating characteristics of the line, whether in fact it would be
loaded a quarter, half, or most of the time, and I think that what we're being told right
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now the basic difference in assumption is

that out of better than 8,000 hours in a year,

the assumption in the testimony offered

President Vial assumes loading of the line only

about 20 percent of the time.

And I guess I would say that that is the most possible

conservative approach to considering the cost of the capital in the line to be rolled into
the operat
lines

cost.

That certainly would not be the case if you were to look at existing

any stretch of the imagination since

're used in excess of 90 percent of the

time.
MR. VIAL:

We haven't been ... hearings on this thing.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

MR. VIAL:

I understand, yes.

What we are attributing I think is the cost of, allocating the cost of the

Northwest cost to the line.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

That's the reason why ...

Okay.

Now I have just one question.

Is the 3.1 billion kilowatt

hours off power annually, is that low?
MR. IMBRECHT:
MR. OGLESBY:

Very.

Very low.

It appears to be 20 percent.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. IMBRECHT:

That's about 20 percent of what the line could carry?

That's right and that's where the difference in cost--that's what it

all boils down to.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

Are there are indications that we will take more from the

Northwest than that?
~ill.

IMBRECHT:

MR. PUGH:
pant.

Oh, much more.

Well again, that would depend upon the individual needs of each partici-

It's hard to say.
MH. UiBRECHT:

I think we could safely say that it's unlikely that it's going to ever

be utilized 20 percent of the time.
MR. PUGH:

Overall, I think that's certainly true.

There was an early late 1983,

early '84 study by the publics alone in Northern California with Western Area Power
Administration, and the assumption on their program was that we would use that 1,600
full time within the publics and it was cost beneficial to the publics under our then
economic scenario just to use it on the basis of summer peak capacity without bringing in
surplus energies or nonfirm sales.

And so on thatcriteria the publics had made a decision

to go forward even if the investor-owned decided at that time in the negotiations not to
participate with us.
parties.

As it came out, the participation was agreed to among all the

Everyone felt they had access and need for it and that created the memorandum

of understanding went forward there, but the publics had reviewed that as a full use line
for themselves at those kinds of prices and costs and was economic.
MR. IMBRECHT:

One final point, the point was made by PG&E and I think it's important

to emphasize in terms of the role the Energy Commission's played in this, along with the
Governor's Administration and that is from the outset of these discussions, which basically
in the Spring of 1983 and really got underway in the summer of '83, is that a basic
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principle was enunciated at the beginning that every utility in California would be
invited to participate and the net result is that every utility, with the exception of a
couple of very small municipals and L.A.W.P. which was already in the BC upgrade project
with Edison, did ultimately become signators to the
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR KEENE:

ect.

Senator Keene.

Is there the slightest possibility that if the Public Utilities

Commission rejected the certificate of public convenience and necessity, that the municipal utilities would be able to go it alone and that the project would be economically
feasible under those circumstances?
MR. PUGH:
a possibility.

I would say that as a result of our reports in late '83, early '84, that's
What it is today?

We have not done the economic studies today.

There is

in the documentation a program that if the certification is not allowed to anyone of or all
of the investor-owned utilities, that under the MOU and documents currently the existing
participants may then sit down and determine whether or not to proceed on the program or
not.

And again, the economic studies are being conducted, commencing now both as to

Phase 1 and Phase 2 studies and those economic studies will show a lot more as to whether
or not that would be a viable alternative at the time if that was the occurrence.
SENATOR KEENE:

So the statement of yours in your report, your statement here that

regulatory approval is a critical path constraint to early development of the project is
not totally air tight?
MR. PUGH:

That is with regard to early approval of the project.

There is a time-

frame ...
SENATOR KEENE:
MR. PUGH:

So the >vord "early" is key?

The word "early" is very key.

what the timeline is.
MR. OGLESBY:
MR. PUGH:

There is a timeframe and, Doug, I forget

If you don't get certification within--what was the final period?

Twenty months after receipt of the ...

Twenty months after application ...

MR. OGLESBY:

..• after the final record of decision on the EIR, then the parties

would sit down and see if they could renegotiate a new project development agreement.
SENATOR KEENE:

What in your judgment is the practical possibility of the municipal

utilities doing it on their ov..'ll if the PUC denies the certificate of convenience and
neces
MR. OGLESBY:

We have not made an analysis of that.

To very candid and I'm sure it

doesn't come as a surprise to Arch, it's something that we need to consider.

But I don't

think we've come to any judgment now as to whether the project would be viable if the
investor-owned utilties did not receive the certificate.
SENATOR KEENE:

Is it going to cause you to urge rash judgments on the part of the

Public Utilities Commission to approve your involvement?
MR. OGLESBY:
Commission.

[Laughs.]

I like to think we would urge rash judgments from the Public Utilities

[Laughter.]
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SENATOR KEENE:
MR. VIAL:

Well, I would

I should

1 mean, after all.

ike to think so too, but I can't.

out that that is a consideration that we would bear in mind.

Whether it's

70 or 80 percent of the ratepayers in California are

ratepayers to the IOU, lOU's, and the balance to the muni's.
bene its to be obtained

If in fact there are mutual

an interregional relationship, it's really important for us in

the PUC to bear that in mind so that teh IOU ratepayers wilJ a] so be ab] e to participate.
Therefore, it might modify to some extent excatly how we app
t

the numbers to the situa-

ion.
SENATOR KEENE:

Well, there might be some very serious legislative concerns at that

point since we're already bailing out the muni's, having to bail them out more might
create a problem.

MR. OGLESBY:

Well, one thing we have to go through a very comprehensive and complex

economic analysis both in order to make our own decision in the company about the economic
justification of the line, and then to present that to the Public Utilities Commission as
part of our application for certification.

One of the things we're considering are the

implications to our ratepayers, almost 4 million electric customers, 10 million people in
the northern two-thirds of California.

What are the implications to all of those people

if we are not a participant in the line and the line nevertheless goes forward?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay, before we wind up I'd like to suggest that we haven't heard

from the other major investor-owned utility and I'd like them to send the committee answers
to the questions that we've asked both PG&E and others so that we can have the input of
Southern Cal Edison as well.
ln closing, for those of you involved in our hearing tomorrow, please note that we
will be meeting in this room, not the Morgan Center as previously scheduled.

We'll

probably have to have somebody over at the Morgan Center sending people here for those
who didn't get that word.
I want to thank participants.

I think it was a good hearing and I think we had,

both the morning and afternoon session, plenty for the committee to digest.
very much.
--ooOoo--
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Thank you

